Texas Trial Court Jurisdiction
Recent Estate and Guardianship Cases
YouKnowItAll.com
© A. Hawkins
2001
Table of Contents
Case #1 Columbia Rio Grande
Regional Hospital v. Stover April 28, 2000 17 S.W.3d 387 (TexApp -Corpus Christi 2000)
Case #2 Garza v. Rodriguez, January 26, 2000 18 S.W.3d 694
(TexApp - San Antonio 2000)
Case #3 Enax v. Noack, January
31, 2000 12 S.W.3d 609 (TexApp Houston[first dist.] 2000)
Case #4 Shuld v Dembrinski, March 17,
2000, 12 S.W.3d 485 (TexApp - Dallas 2000)
Case #5 Jansen v. Fitzpatrick, March 2, 2000 14 S.W.3d 426
(TexApp Houston [14th district] 2000)
Case #6A Phifer, administrator of the
Estate of Bailey v. Nacogdoches County Central Appraisal District April 25, 2000 (TexApp Tyler 2000)
(Opinion later withdrawn... see 6B)
Majority Opinion by Justice Worthen,
joined by Justice Hadden Dissenting Opinion by Chief Justice Murphy
Case #6B Phifer, administrator of the
Estate of Bailey v. Nacogdoches County Central Appraisal District October 31, 2000 (TexApp Tyler 2000) (Replaces 6A)
Opinion by Justice Worthen,
Case #7 Sabine Gas Transmission
Company, et al. v. Winnie Pipeline Transmission Company and Southeastern
Marketing Company, et al March 2, 2000 15 S.W.3d 199 (TexApp Houston [14th dist.]
2000)
A Note on Texas Probate and
Guardianship Jurisdiction
Texas,
trial court probate and guardianship[1]
jurisdiction is not a subject for the timid. There are hundreds of
published appellate opinions on Texas trial court probate jurisdiction issues
since probate jurisdiction was reformed in 1973. It is not an easy subject. A surprisingly large portion of Texas
probate litigation is void because the trial occurs in a court which lacks
jurisdiction. Other litigation is erroneously dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction by courts that do have jurisdiction. Court proceedings without
jurisdiction are void. Many lawyers think estate and trust litigation is easy.
It isn't. Many lawyers and judges don't
even know the issues, much less the law.
Many clueless lawyers become trial and appellate judges. Probate trial court jurisdiction law is
complicated. Some law is unwritten. Some remains undecided. Sometimes the judges on an appellate court
disagree among themselves. Texas estate
jurisdiction has been described as a nightmare[2] but it isn’t literally a nightmare.
It is more like a horror story that causes nightmares for those who are exposed
to it. Do you dare read on?
Keeping Score
Some
might want to note the number of cases in which:
1. The trial court had jurisdiction to hear
what it heard.
2. The trial court did not have jurisdiction
to hear what it heard.
3. The court of appeals claims that judicial
efficiency is the goal, thus demonstrating a sly sense of humor.
Texas probate jurisdiction is not simple or rational. Much is unclear and unsettled. It is a mess.[3]
If anyone thinks they know it all, this course may change your
opinion. When it comes to Texas probate
jurisdiction, no one knows it all. No one can know it all. For those who enjoy
complexity, this course is a delight. Those who seek rational patterns will be
frustrated. These cases may give you a
headache. Aspirin may help.
A Note about footnotes
Most
citations by the court are moved from the opinions to footnotes in order to
enhance readability. Commentary is provided, both in the main text and in
footnotes. Footnotes by the courts or the courts retain the court's footnote
number in both the text and our footnote. Some footnotes by the court and some
repetitive citations may be omitted.[4]
Some names are shortened to first or last names.[5]
Before each case the symbol * *
* * * visually identifies the case and allows you to search for * * * * * to
move to the next case.
The Course Text
* * * * *
Case #1 Columbia Rio Grande Regional Hospital v. Stover April 28, 2000 17 S.W.3d 387 (TexApp
-Corpus Christi 2000)
Columbia[6] shows how a creditor may turn a claim against an estate into a
liability to the estate, a remarkable feat in most places, but an easy one in
Texas. The path through the courts is
an interesting one that is all too representative of the tangled processing of
probate cases and issues in Texas.
In Texas, the first test in probate litigation is determining
which court has jurisdiction. Many fail
that test. The rules governing creditors claims are difficult and treacherous.
Many fail to pick their way through them. The rules governing the interplay of
jurisdiction, creditors claims, and independent administrations are almost
impossible to follow. The best guidebook may be the classic tale of Alice in
Wonderland. Clearly the spirit of Lewis
Carroll is alive. As you read Columbia,
ask yourself what the difference is between a dependent and independent
administration of an estate. Feel free
to be skeptical of the court's analysis of the concept of county court at law
jurisdiction over independent executors.
“Appellant Columbia Rio Grande Regional Hospital, a medical
provider, filed a declaratory action against Stover, independent executrix of
the estate of Reed, deceased. Stover filed a motion for summary judgment
asserting, inter alia, the action was barred by res judicata and collateral
estoppel. . . . We affirm.
“Columbia provided medical services to Reed for an
on-the-job injury. Columbia charged Reed
for services provided in the amount of $15,395.85, and later filed a hospital
lien for that amount in Hidalgo County. 1[7]
Subsequently, Reed filed suit against his employer in the 206th District
Court in Hidalgo County (Reed Lawsuit). Columbia filed notice of its hospital
lien in the Reed Lawsuit. 2[8]
During the course of the lawsuit Reed
died, and Stover filed an application to probate Reed's will. The probate
court, County Court at Law No. 4, Hidalgo County, in Cause No. 25,040-D,
appointed Stover independent executrix of Reed's estate. Stover stepped in as
plaintiff in the Reed Lawsuit. When the lawsuit settled, the 206th District
Court entered judgment whereby the defendant's insurer, Motors Insurance
Corporation (Motors), agreed to tender to Stover the settlement amount of $135,000.00, out of which Columbia's
hospital lien was to be satisfied, depending on the outcome of litigation
between the estate and Columbia. Motors issued a $15,395.85 check payable to
Stover's trustee and Columbia. Stover refused to sign the check over to
Columbia and the district court placed the funds in its registry.
“At Stover's request, the
district court ordered Motors' check transferred to the registry of the county
court where the estate was being probated. Columbia then filed an authenticated claim for Reed's medical expenses
in the probate proceeding. In response, Stover filed a motion to bar Columbia's claim asserting the claim did
not attach to the estate or, alternately, the claim was untimely filed. The
probate court granted Stover's motion.
“Contemporaneously with these proceedings, Columbia filed an original declaratory
judgment action against Stover urging its rights pursuant to the hospital
lien. Columbia's action was assigned the same cause number as the probate
proceeding in County Court at Law No. 4. Stover answered, counterclaimed, and
filed a motion for summary judgment based on the affirmative defenses of res
judicata and collateral estoppel. In her motion, Stover asserted Columbia's
causes of action were barred because Columbia's claims had been adjudicated by either:
(1) the judgment of the 206th District Court regarding Reed's personal injury
cause of action; or (2) the order of the probate court barring Columbia's
claim. Columbia responded and objected to Stover's summary judgment evidence.
Columbia also filed a cross motion for summary judgment and amended its
petition. Stover did not amend her motion.
“On January 26, 1998, by agreement of the parties, the
probate court severed Columbia's action against Stover from the probate
proceeding and assigned the severed action cause number 25,040-D-1. On February
3, 1998, the probate court granted Stover's summary judgment motion. The
probate court did not rule on Columbia's cross motion for summary judgment. On
February 10, 1998, Stover non-suited her counterclaim against Columbia.
“In addition to the foregoing litigation, Columbia filed suit against Motors in
County Court at Law No. 3, asserting liability for paying over the hospital
lien and for not paying the proceeds directly to Columbia. Motors filed an
unopposed motion to consolidate Columbia's suit against Motors with cause
number 25,040-D. The motion was granted on February 4, 1998.
“By points of error one and three Columbia complains that
the summary judgment is not final because it does not dispose of all claims and
parties. Columbia first asserts this appeal is taken from cause number
25,040-D, the cause into which its claims against Motors were consolidated.
Columbia argues that because the summary judgment does not address its claims
against Motors, it is interlocutory. In response, Stover asserts this appeal is
from cause number 25,040-D-1, a cause severed out of 25,040-D. Stover contends
because Columbia's claims against Motors were never before the trial court in
the severed cause, she did not need to address them.
“We agree with Stover that the
appeal is from case
number 25,040-D-1. On January 26, 1998,
the trial court signed an agreed order severing Columbia's cause of action
against Stover from the probate proceeding, cause number 25,040-D, and assigning
that action a new cause number, 25,040-D-1.[9]
The court granted Stover's summary judgment in the severed action on
February 3, 1998. The following day, February 4, 1998, Columbia's lawsuit
against Motors was consolidated with the probate proceeding, cause number
25,040-D, not the severed cause. Columbia's claims against Motors were never
before the trial court in cause number 25,040-D-1. As Motors was never a party
to the severed lawsuit, it was not necessary for the summary judgment to
address Columbia's claims against Motors.
“. . . Finally,
Stover concedes that the order was interlocutory because the summary judgment
order did not address Stover's counterclaims. The probate court, however,
non-suited Stover's counterclaim on February 10, 1998, seven days after the
entry of the summary judgment. Where an interlocutory order is entered
disposing of the interests of less than all parties and claims, that order does
not become final until a subsequent order is entered disposing of the remaining
parties and claims.[10]
Once an order has been entered disposing of all remaining parties and
issues, all the orders merge, creating a final and appealable judgment. Id.
Therefore, the probate court's summary judgment, interlocutory in nature when
granted, became final on February 10, 1998, when the trial court disposed of
Stover's counterclaim. Because we conclude the judgment from which Columbia
appealed is a final judgment, this Court has jurisdiction to hear Columbia's
appeal. . . .
“Res judicata prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause
of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that,
with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the earlier suit.[11]
The claim of res judicata requires proof of the following: (1) a prior
final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity
of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the
same claims as were raised or could have been raised in the first action.[12]
“We note at the outset that Columbia's brief contains no
assertion that Stover failed to establish the identity of parties, the second
element of res judicata. Further, while Columbia asserts Stover failed to
establish the third element of res judicata, a second action based on the same
claims as were raised or could have been raised in the first action, its brief
contains no argument, supported by citations to authorities and the record, as
to why its declaratory judgment action is not based on claims raised or claims
that could have been raised.[13]
Accordingly, Columbia's argument
is restricted to its contention that Stover did not establish the first element
of res judicata, a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
“Columbia first argues that there is no prior order
adjudicating its claims. Columbia
contends that the probate court had no jurisdiction to enter the order;
therefore, the prior probate order granting Stover's motion to barr Columbia's
lien in the probate proceeding is void. Columbia asserts that the probate order
constitutes a nullity and cannot be the basis of a defense of res judicata.
“Columbia contends claim
administration by an independent administrator is to be conducted in accordance
with sections 145 and 146 of the Texas Probate Code without further action by
the court. Columbia argues section 145(h) expressly denies the probate court
jurisdiction in the administration of the estate, including claims
administration. Stover asserts the probate court has jurisdiction pursuant to
sections 5 and 5A of the code. Stover urges sections 5 and 5A must be read in
conjunction with the last phrase of section 145(h) allowing for intervention
where the code specifically provides for action in the probate court.
Section 145(h) of the probate code provides:
When an independent administration has been created, and the
order appointing an independent executor has been entered by the county court,
and the inventory, appraisement, and list aforesaid has been filed by the
executor and approved by the county court, as long as the estate is represented
by an independent executor, further action of any nature shall not be had in
the county court except where this Code specifically and explicitly provides
for some action in the county court.[14]
“While the general purpose of section 145 is to free the
independent executor from the control of the court, except where the code
specifically and explicitly provides otherwise,[15] it is equally clear that courts
have determined the legislature did not intend for the independent
administrator to be completely free from judicial supervision.[16]
Because we conclude that section
145(h) does not deny a statutory county court jurisdiction over an independent
administration, we look to code provisions that address probate jurisdiction in
statutory county courts.
“The general jurisdiction of a statutory county court
sitting in probate is described in sections 5 and 5A. The applicable provisions
of section 5 include:
(c) In those counties where there is a statutory probate
court, county court at law, or other statutory court exercising the
jurisdiction of a probate court, all applications, petitions and motions
regarding probate and administrations shall be filed and heard in such courts
and the constitutional county court, rather than in the district courts, unless
otherwise provided by the legislature, and the judges of such courts may hear
any of such matters sitting for the judge of any of such courts. In contested
matters, the judge of the constitutional county court may on his own motion,
and shall on the motion of any party to the proceeding, transfer the proceeding
to the statutory probate court, county court at law, or other statutory court
exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court, which may then hear the
proceeding as if originally filed in such court.
. . .
(e) All courts exercising original probate jurisdiction
shall have the power to hear all matters incident to an estate.[17]
“Significantly, probate code section 5(c) states that all
motions regarding probate and administrations shall be filed and heard in
statutory county courts exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court. [18]
Section 5(e) further provides those courts exercising original probate
jurisdiction, which include statutory county courts pursuant to section 5(c),
shall have the power to hear all matters incident to an estate.[19]
This is a general grant of authority to statutory county courts. [20]
Additionally, probate code section 5A(a) plainly states that in
proceedings in statutory county courts at law, the phrase "incident to an
estate" includes "all claims by or against an estate," and
"generally all matters relating to the settlement, partition, and
distribution of estates of deceased persons."[21]
This statute codifies case law.[22]
“Columbia's reliance on Carter v. Brady[23] for the proposition that a probate
court has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of claims against an estate
being administered by an independent executor, is misplaced. Carter predates
the legislature's 1973 modification of the jurisdictional framework for probate
matters and case law interpreting those changes.[24]
In English, the Texas Supreme Court recognized that the obvious purpose
of the 1973 changes was "to increase the jurisdiction of such courts in
'matters incident to an estate' so that a decedent's estate could be more
efficiently settled in one proceeding." [25]
Subsequently, the legislature added section 5A to the code, further
expanding statutory county court jurisdiction to matters including, "but
not limited to, all claims by or against an estate . . , and generally all
matters relating to the settlement, partition, and distribution of estates. . .
."[26]
A probate court's jurisdiction has been greatly expanded since Carter.
“County Court at Law No. 4 in Hidalgo
County, a statutory county court, appointed Stover independent executrix of
Reed's estate pursuant to section 145, and administered the probate proceeding.[27] Columbia filed an authenticated
claim in the probate court. Stover filed a motion in the court to bar
Columbia's claim, a claim Stover believed to be barred because it did not
attach to the estate or, alternately, because it was untimely filed. Columbia's
claim was against the estate. The claim necessarily involved the assets of the
estate. The outcome would have a direct bearing on the settlement, partition,
and distribution of the estate. Accordingly, we conclude Stover's motion
involved matters "incident to the estate," and the probate court had
jurisdiction to hear Stover's motion. The probate court's order of September
24, 1997, granting Stover's motion to bar Columbia's claim is not void for lack
of jurisdiction.
“The final order barring Columbia's
claim was appealable to this Court.[28] [29] Because no direct appeal of the
September 24, 1997, probate order was taken by Columbia, it cannot now attack
the order collaterally.[30]
“Accordingly, we hold there was a prior final judgment on
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. Stover established the first
element of res judicata, the only element about which Columbia complains.
Therefore, the summary judgment is sustainable on that ground.
* * * * *
Case #2 Garza v. Rodriguez, January 26, 2000 18 S.W.3d 694
(TexApp - San Antonio 2000)
For those who think that Texas title
passes by a will and not by an order of a probate court, Garza is very
interesting indeed. Garza addresses a devise of real estate in fee simple
subject to a springing executory interest that didn’t spring because an
unexplained constitutional county court order of final probate settling,
approving, and closing an estate granted fee simple absolute title and did not
account for the springing executory interest expressly provided in the will.
Garza does not discuss whether the issue was plead, litigated, considered by
the county court prior to the probate court order or whether the constitutional
county court had proper jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter. The possibility that the order was a
superfluous and erroneous attempt to recite the will provisions by a draftsman
who was clueless about a fee simple subject to a springing executory interest
is not discussed. It seems that the
court had enough on its mind without those considerations.
“Appellants appeal from a dismissal order from the 229th
District Court of Starr County, dismissing their suit to construe a previously
probated will for want of jurisdiction. Because a court is not permitted to
interfere with the final judgment of another court of equal jurisdiction, we
affirm the trial court's order of dismissal.
“Appellants filed a declaratory action in the 229th District
Court in Starr County to construe the previously probated will of their aunt
Maria Lopez de Pena (hereinafter "Pena"), asserting that they are the
legal owners of certain real property bequeathed in Pena's will. The property
at issue consists of nine tracts of land, which have mineral interests. In
their action, appellants also sought partition of the land to which they claim
entitlement.
“Pena's will, executed on January 22, 1943, provided in relevant
part:
It is my will that all the rest and residue of my property,
both real and personal and of any nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever
situated of which I shall die seized and possessed, shall pass to and be vested
in fee simple title to my nephew, Santiago Rodriguez, Jr., son of my sister
Eusebia Lopez de Rodriguez, to be owned and enjoyed by him with God's and my
blessings forever. . . . But should he die without lawful issue of his body,
then, and in that event, it is my will and wish that all of my aforesaid
property shall pass to and be vested in fee simple in my sister, the said
Eusebia Lopez de Rodriguez, her heirs and their descendants per stirpes.
“By this provision, Pena granted to Santiago a fee simple
interest in her real property subject to a shifting executory interest in favor
of Santiago's mother, Eusebia Lopez de Rodriguez, her heirs and their
descendants per stirpes.
Pena died on June 1, 1956; her will was presented for
probate the following week in the constitutional county court of Starr County.
On July 29, 1957[31] [32] an order of final probate settling,
approving, and closing Pena's estate was entered in the county court.[33]
With respect to Santiago's interest, it provided that:
[T]he remainder of the lands owned
by Maria Lopez de Pena, including all funds in the bank, as well as all real
estate and personal property were bequeathed and given to Santiago Rodriguez,
Jr. . . . .[34]
“The final probate order thus
granted fee simple absolute title to the remainder of Pena's estate to
Santiago; the final probate order did not account for the springing executory
interest expressly stated in the will.[35]
“On October 19, 1984,[36] Santiago died intestate, survived
by his wife, Olivia Olivarez Rodriguez, and one adopted son, Gabriel Rodriguez.
Because Santiago died without lawful issue, appellants, Eusebia Lopez de
Rodriguez's heirs, concluded that they became the legal owners of the real
property Pena conditionally devised to Santiago through the 1943 will.
“On July 8, 1986, appellants filed a
declaratory action in the 229th district court of Starr County, asking the
court to construe the will of Pena to declare them the legal and beneficial
owners of Pena's property due to the springing executory interest, which they
claim divested Santiago of his ownership. Appellants also requested the district court to
partition the subject property among them. At
the time of this filing, no probate matter concerning either Pena's estate or
Santiago's estate was pending. On August 4, 1986, appellees filed a declaration
of heirship in the county court at law[37] of Starr County. That same day, appellees also filed in the district
court their original answer and a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
which the trial court later granted. . . .
“Appellants argue that the district court erred in
dismissing their suit to construe Pena's will because the district court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the county court over matters "incident to an
estate" when, as here, a probate matter is not pending in the county
court. Construction of a will and issues of title are matters incident to an
estate; thus, the district court had jurisdiction over the matters because the
county court's probate jurisdiction had not been invoked.[38] Appellants further assert that the
district court had jurisdiction to act because their pleadings requested the
imposition of a constructive trust.[39]
“Appellees counter that the trial court properly
dismissed the underlying action because in counties such as Starr County, where
there is a county court at law exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court,
all probate matters shall be filed and heard in such courts and the
constitutional county court, rather than in the district courts.[40] Appellees note that in section 5(c)
counties, district court jurisdiction may be invoked by a proper transfer or by
pleadings that clearly set out a cause of action and request for relief which
the county court at law exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court cannot
provide.[41]
Appellees note that the instant case does not involve a transfer
situation; thus, they contend the district court's jurisdiction could be
invoked only if appellants sought relief which the probate court could not
grant. Appellees further argue that because the county court[42]
previously acquired jurisdiction over Pena's estate, the district court
would be without authority to consider an attack on the county court's probate
order.
“County courts have the general jurisdiction of a probate
court.[43]
In most counties in Texas, the constitutional county courts
("county courts") act as the probate court.[44] As a
probate court, county courts are empowered to: [P]robate wills, grant letters
testamentary and of administration, settle accounts of personal
representatives, and transact all business appertaining to estates subject to
administration or guardianship, including the settlement, partition, and
distribution of such estates.[45]
Historically, a probate court did not have the power to construe
provisions of a will or decide matters of title because such matters were
considered outside the purview of probate matters; they were considered matters
incident to an estate.[46]
The construction of a will or issues of title were thus general civil
matters within the jurisdictional reach of the district courts.[47] [48]
“In 1973,[49] the county court's probate
jurisdiction was expanded when the Legislature undertook a two-step reform of
probate jurisdiction.[50]
First, it proposed an amendment to article 5, section 8 of the
constitution authorizing a statutory revision of probate jurisdiction.[51] [52] Second, to carry out the proposed
constitutional mandate, it amended section 5 of the Probate Code. As amended,
section 5 expanded the jurisdiction of the county court in probate matters to
allow it the power to hear all matters incident to an estate, including, but
not limited to, an action to construe a will.[53]
Section 5's clause "matter incident to an estate," however,
will not create jurisdiction for the county court in the absence of a pending
probate matter.[54]
Stated differently, before a matter can be regarded as incident to an
estate over which the county court acting as a probate court would have
jurisdiction, a probate proceeding must actually be pending.[55]
As explained by the Supreme Court, a court empowered with probate
jurisdiction may only exercise its probate jurisdiction over matters incident
to an estate when a probate matter proceeding related to such matter is already
pending. Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal Dist.[56]
[57]
“As noted, at the time appellants filed suit in the district
court, no probate matter concerning either Pena's estate or Santiago's estate
was pending. Appellants thus conclude that because a probate matter was not
pending when appellants filed suit, and because appellants' suit concerns
matters traditionally outside the scope of a probate court's jurisdiction, the
district court had jurisdiction over the suit to construe the provisions of
Pena's will. In support of this argument, appellants rely primarily upon
Crawford v. Williams[58]
“In Crawford, a will was admitted to probate in
constitutional county court in 1968.[59]
In 1986, several heirs brought suit in the district court seeking a
declaration that the will was null and void due to fraud, a partition of
certain real property, an accounting of rents, royalties, and waste on the real
property, and a distribution of the real property through the laws of
intestacy.[60]
The district court set aside the will, determined heirship, partitioned
the real property, and ordered an accounting.[61]
In sustaining a challenge that the district court lacked jurisdiction
over the proceeding, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals determined that
because the county court had already acquired jurisdiction over the estate, and
because the later action sought to set aside an already probated will, the
district court, under the doctrine of noninterference, was prevented from
exercising jurisdiction over the matter.[62] The fact that the action was a
direct attack on the county court's order admitting the will to probate was
compelling to the court.[63]
The court also seemed to place much importance on the fact that under
amended section 5 of the Probate Code, the county court would have the
jurisdiction to hear the will contest.[64]
“It is not clear from the facts of Crawford whether a final
order of probate, which would close the estate and end the county court's
jurisdiction over the proceeding, was entered. Appellants assume that the
estate was not closed, and therefore argue that Crawford is consistent with the
general rule that once the probate court has acquired jurisdiction over a
probate matter, the district court lacks the power to act. They argue that
since a probate matter was not pending in the instant case, the district court
had jurisdiction to act.
“At oral argument, appellants argued that Gordy v.
Alexander,[65] a case in which the Amarillo Court
of Appeals determined that section 5 of the Probate Code did not divest the
district court of jurisdiction to act in a suit to impose a constructive trust
on assets of an estate where the will was previously probated, required
reversal in the instant case.[66]
“We disagree with appellants' argument and their reliance
upon Crawford and Gordy in the instant case. In fact, our reading of Crawford
requires a result different from the one sought by appellants. Our disagreement
with appellants’ argument lies not in their general explanation of Texas
probate jurisdiction, which is, ‘to say the least, [a] somewhat complex
[scheme].’ [67]
We agree that under the current statutory scheme of probate
jurisdiction, a district court can exercise jurisdiction over a matter incident
to an estate where no probate court has otherwise acquired jurisdiction over
the estate. This is so because section 5 of the Probate Code does not grant the
probate court exclusive jurisdiction over matters incident to an estate.[68]
This jurisdictional scheme, however, would not allow a court to
interfere with the final judgment of another court of equal jurisdiction. Our
disagreement with appellants’ argument concerns this general principle of
non-interference.[69]
“By this lawsuit, appellants seek a declaration that they
are the legal and beneficial owners of Pena's property due to the springing
executory interest contained in Pena's will. As previously noted, however, that
future interest was not accounted for in the 1957 final probate order settling,
approving, and closing Pena's estate.[70]
The final order, whether by mistake or design, unambiguously granted[71]
Santiago fee simple absolute title to the remainder of Pena's estate.
That order was not challenged.[72]
The current action challenges the 1957 final probate order to the extent
that appellants seek a construction of Pena's will that is contrary to what was
previously determined, correctly or incorrectly, by the probate court. A court
is not permitted to interfere with the final judgment of another court of equal
jurisdiction.[73]
An action to undo an incorrect former judgment must be brought in the
court rendering the judgment or in a higher court.[74]
Because the instant action seeks to undo the prior probate order, the
district court properly determined it did not have jurisdiction.[75]
* * * * *
Case #3 Enax v. Noack, January
31, 2000 12 S.W.3d 609 (TexApp Houston[first dist.] 2000)
Is that enough fun
with trial court jurisdiction? No such luck. We turn to In Enax, the court of
appeals finds subject matter jurisdiction of a county court at law to impose a
constructive trust in a guardianship. Transfer from a county court at law to a
district court is upheld. A district court judgment based on a county court at
law jury verdict is upheld. The court of appeals holds belief that the legislature increased the jurisdiction
of guardianship courts while specifically intending to make no such
change. Probate litigation is full of
surprises.
“The primary issues on appeal are (1) whether the county
court at law may impose a constructive trust in a guardianship proceeding and
(2) whether the county court at law may transfer the case to the district court
for rendition of judgment when the ward dies after the jury reaches its
verdict, but before a final judgment is signed. We reverse in part and affirm
in part.
“Lloyd Enax is Hilda Enax's son.
Hilda developed Alzheimer's disease in the late 1980s, and Lloyd assumed care of Hilda when she
became a widow in 1989. In October 1990, Lloyd sold Hilda's home in Spring and
bought a new home for her in Brenham, near his home. Hilda lived in the Brenham
home until April 1996, when she was moved to a nursing home. Lloyd then sold
the Brenham home. During this time, Lloyd
allowed his property to become commingled with Hilda's property.
“In February 1996,
Lloyd applied and was appointed guardian of Hilda's person and estate. In
August 1996, Hilda's granddaughter, Lori Noack-May, filed an application to
revoke Lloyd's guardianship and to be appointed as the successor guardian. On
August 27, 1996, the county court at law
removed Lloyd as guardian, appointed Lori as successor guardian,
temporarily restrained Lloyd from spending any proceeds from the sale of
Hilda's house, and froze Lloyd's bank account. The county court at law later
issued a temporary injunction incorporating the terms of the temporary
restraining order. In September 1996, Lori,
as successor guardian, sued Lloyd to recover Hilda's property under theories of
negligence, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.
Lori also asked the court to impose a constructive and resulting trust.
“After a question arose concerning a
conflict of interest, the county court at law appointed Hilda's daughter,
Sheila Enax, as guardian, and Sheila became the plaintiff in the suit against Lloyd. Before the
case came to trial, the county court at
law ordered Lloyd to turn all of Hilda's property over to Sheila and to make a
final accounting of his administration as guardian. Lloyd never complied.
“The case was tried to a jury in February 1997. The jury returned a verdict for Sheila,
awarding $191,989.65 in actual damages
and $216,989.65 in exemplary damages and imposing a constructive trust on Lloyd
for $141,989.65. On February 26, 1997, the
county court at law rendered judgment on the verdict. In March 1997, the
county court at law dissolved the temporary injunction.
“Lloyd timely filed a motion for new trial and a motion to
modify the judgment. On May 13, 1997, the
county court at law signed an amended interlocutory judgment, which in part
reduced the actual damages by $5,000.00. The judgment was made interlocutory to
allow an appraisal of real estate owned by Lloyd that would be subject to the
constructive trust.
“Hilda died on June 21, 1997, before
the county court at law signed an amended final judgment. In August 1997, Verna
Lois Noack was appointed as the executrix of Hilda's estate, and the county
court at law allowed her to substitute as the plaintiff. On October 9, 1997,
the county court at law transferred the case[76] to the district court with the
district court's permission. On December 30, 1997, the district court signed a
final amended judgment, awarding $186,989.65 in actual damages and $216,989.65
in exemplary damages and imposing a constructive trust on Lloyd for
$141,989.65.
“. . . Lloyd brings an issue of first impression, contending
the county court at law lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to impose a
constructive trust in a guardianship proceeding. 1[77]
Relying on cases holding that only statutory probate courts and district
courts may impose constructive trusts in probate proceedings, Lloyd argues that
the county court at law had no authority to impose a constructive trust in a
guardianship proceeding. We disagree.
“Both Lloyd and Verna agree that in probate proceedings the
constitutional county courts and the statutory county courts at law have no
authority to employ the equitable remedy of imposing a constructive trust.[78]
The rationale behind these decisions is based on an interpretation of
Probate Code section 5A:
Constitutional
County Court and Statutory County Court at Law
§ 5A.
Matters Appertaining and Incident to an Estate and Other Probate Court Jurisdiction
(a) In
proceedings in the constitutional county courts and statutory county courts at
law, the phrases "appertaining to estates" and "incident to an
estate" in this Code include
the
probate of wills,
the
issuance of letters testamentary and of administration,
the
determination of heirship,
and also
include, but are not limited to,
all
claims by or against an estate,
all
actions for trial of title to land incident to an estate and for the
enforcement of liens thereon incident to an estate,
all
actions for trial of the right of property incident to an estate,
and
actions to construe wills, and
generally
all matters relating to the settlement, partition, and distribution of estates
of deceased persons.
Statutory
Probate Court and District Court
§ 5A. Matters
Appertaining and Incident to an Estate and Other Probate Court Jurisdiction
(b) In
proceedings in the statutory probate courts and districts courts, the phrases
"appertaining to estates" and "incident to an estate" in
this Code include
the
probate of wills,
the
issuance of letters testamentary and of administration, and
the
determination of heirship,
and also
include, but are not limited to,
all
claims by or against an estate,
all
actions for trial of title to land and for the enforcement of liens thereon,
all
actions for trial of the right of property,
all
actions to construe wills,
the
interpretation and administration of testamentary trusts and the applying of
constructive trusts, and
generally
all matters relating to the settlement, partition, and distribution of estates
of deceased persons.
“Because
the legislature has given specific authority to the statutory probate courts
and district courts over "all actions to construe wills, the
interpretation and administration of testamentary trusts and the applying of
constructive trusts," the above cited cases interpreted this specific
grant of authority to deny the constitutional county courts and statutory
county courts at law the authority to impose constructive trusts.[79] 2 We do not agree with this interpretation
of §5A. [80]
“Before 1993, section 5A applied to both probate and
guardianship proceedings.[81]
In 1993, the legislature rewrote the guardianship laws and separated
them into a new chapter XIII of the Probate Code.[82]
As a part of the 1993 revision, guardianship provisions have been
removed from section 5A and ‘mirrored’ in a new section 607:
CONSTITUTIONAL
COUNTY COURT AND STATUTORY
COUNTY COURT AT LAW
PROVISIONS
Probate
§ 5A.
Matters Appertaining and Incident to an Estate and Other Probate Court Jurisdiction
(a) In
proceedings in the constitutional county courts and statutory county courts at
law, the phrases "appertaining to estates" and "incident to an
estate" in this Code include
the
probate of wills,
the
issuance of letters testamentary and of administration,
the
determination of heirship, and
also
include, but are not limited to,
all
claims by or against an estate,
all
actions for trial of title to land incident to an estate and for the
enforcement of liens thereon incident to an estate,
all actions
for trial of the right of property incident to an estate, and actions to
construe wills, and
generally
all matters relating to the settlement, partition, and distribution of estates
of deceased persons.
Guardianship
§ 607. Matters
Appertaining and Incident to an Estate
(a) In a proceeding in a
constitutional county court or a statutory county court at law, the phrases
"appertaining to estates" and "incident to an estate" in
this chapter include
the
appointment of guardians,
the
issuance of letters of guardianship,
a
claim by or against a guardianship estate,
all
actions for trial of title to land incident to a guardianship estate and for
the enforcement of liens incident to a guardianship estate,
all
actions for trial of the right of property incident to a guardianship estate,
and
generally
all matters relating to the settlement, partition, and distribution of a
guardianship estate.