Texas Trial Court Jurisdiction

Recent Estate and Guardianship[1] Cases # 1
YouKnowItAll.com

© A. Hawkins 2004

Suitability

This course is suitable for all litigators and estate lawyers. In Texas, probate jurisdiction may affect any type of litigation. All litigators should understand the effect of Texas probate jurisdiction on cases that would seem to be unrelated to probate.

Scope

This course arbitrarily compiles the reported cases decided from January through October 2000 on Texas trial court probate and guardianship jurisdiction. These cases reveal an amazing variety of jurisdictional issues and peculiarities that arose over a few months. This course is like a pound box of assorted chocolates, with some of one kind, and some of another. Nutty ones predominate. It might be said that none of these cases involve "normal" issues. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that nutty Texas probate jurisdiction issues are normal. Upon completion of this course, you will not know everything there is to know about Texas probate jurisdiction. Instead, you will have a clear sense of the nuttiness and difficulty of the topic.

A Note on Texas Probate and Guardianship Jurisdiction

Texas trial court probate and guardianship[2] jurisdiction is not a subject for the timid. There are hundreds of published appellate opinions on Texas trial court probate jurisdiction issues since probate jurisdiction was revised in 1973. It is not an easy subject. Court proceedings without jurisdiction are void. A surprisingly large portion of Texas probate litigation is void because the trial occurs in a court which lacks jurisdiction. Other litigation is erroneously dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by courts that do have jurisdiction. Many lawyers think estate and trust litigation is easy. It isn't. Many lawyers who litigate these cases and judges who preside don't even know the issues, much less the law. Many clueless lawyers become trial and appellate judges. Probate trial court jurisdiction law is complicated. Some law is unwritten. Some remains undecided. Sometimes the judges on an appellate court disagree among themselves. Texas probate jurisdiction is not simple or rational. Much is unclear and unsettled. It is a mess.[3] If anyone thinks they know it all, this course may change your opinion. When it comes to Texas probate jurisdiction, no one knows it all. No one can know it all. For those who enjoy complexity, this course is a delight. Those who seek rational patterns will be frustrated. These cases may give you a headache. A real box of chocolate, aspirin, or other drugs may help. Texas estate jurisdiction has been described as a nightmare,[4] but it isn’t literally a nightmare. It is more like a horror story that causes nightmares for those who are exposed to it. Do you dare read on?

Keeping Score

Some might want to note the number of cases in which:

1. The trial court had jurisdiction to hear what it heard.

2. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to hear what it heard.

3. The court of appeals claims that judicial efficiency is the goal, thus demonstrating a sly sense of humor.

The Process

1. Study this text.

2. When you finish this text, go to www.YouKnowItAll.com to observe the discussion. There, you may choose to ask questions or make comments, or you may choose to just observe any discussion posted by others.

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4. YouKnowItAll.com provides a certificate of your attendance with the course name, course number, and the CLE credit hours you earned. If you are in the Texas bar, we report your credit to the State Bar of Texas. If you are in another bar and need something else, let us know.

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This course is primarily a case study which relies on the words of the courts which are quoted so that you may read them yourself. The teacher has selected quotations, deleted original emphasis, added the authors emphasis, and moved citations to footnotes. Commentary by the teacher is included in the text and in footnotes. Five asterisks ( * * * * * ) identify each new case, If a case doesn’t interest you, just search for * * * * * to find the next one. This also helps if you wish to go back to reread a case.

There are three kinds of footnotes.

1. Footnotes by the court retain the court’s original number. Our footnote is a footnote to that number.

2. Footnotes that move citations to the footnotes are intended to make the material more readable. Our footnote has the court’s citations.

3. Footnotes that contain some of the author’s commentary.

If you read this course online, your browser will probably let you click on a footnote number to go to the footnote and click on the number in the footnote to return to the text. Some browsers will show the footnote if you hold your curser over the footnote number without clicking If you print the text, you may wish to staple the footnotes separately so you may easily refer to them. They are at the end because of technicalities of the internet. This is a Microsoft Word document displayed as a web page. You may copy it into a word processor to print it if you like. If you have any problems, let us know.

Optional Telephone Conference

The teacher is available for an optional personal telephone conference on the substance of this course. If you have a question about the application of the material in this course to a particular case, or would just like to visit about this topic, you may do so. A brief basic phone conference is $20 per course. If you would like to schedule a phone conference, email or call YouKnowItAll.com.

Table of Contents

Case #1 Columbia Rio Grande Regional Hospital v. Stover

April 28, 2000 17 S.W.3d 387 (TexApp -Corpus Christi 2000)

Case #2 Garza v. Rodriguez

January 26, 2000 18 S.W.3d 694 (TexApp - San Antonio 2000)

Case #3 Enax v. Noack

January 31, 2000 12 S.W.3d 609 (TexApp Houston[1st dist.] 2000)

Case #4 Schuld v Dembrinski

March 17, 2000, 12 S.W.3d 485 (TexApp - Dallas 2000)

Case #5 Jansen v. Fitzpatrick

March 2, 2000 14 S.W.3d 426 (TexApp Houston [14th district] 2000)

Case #6A Phifer, administrator of the Estate of Bailey v. Nacogdoches County Central Appraisal District

April 25, 2000 (TexApp Tyler 2000) (Opinion later withdrawn... see 6B)

Majority Opinion by Justice Worthen, joined by Justice Hadden Dissenting Opinion by Chief Justice Murphy

Case #6B Phifer, administrator of the Estate of Bailey v. Nacogdoches County Central Appraisal District

October 31, 2000 45 S.W.3d 159 (TexApp - Tyler 2000) (Replaces 6A)

Opinion by Justice Worthen,

Case #7 Sabine Gas Transmission Company, et al. v. Winnie Pipeline Transmission Company and Southeastern Marketing Company, et al

March 2, 2000 15 S.W.3d 199 (TexApp Houston [14th dist.] 2000)

Case #8 Herring v. Welborn July 12, 2000 27 S.W.3d 132 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000)

Majority Opinion by Chief Justice Hardberger, joined by Justice López, and joined in part by Justice Green who also dissented in part.

Concurring and dissenting opinion by: Paul W. Green, Justice

The Course Text

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Case #1 Columbia Rio Grande Regional Hospital v. Stover

April 28, 2000 17 S.W.3d 387 (TexApp -Corpus Christi 2000)

Columbia[5] shows how a creditor may turn a claim against an estate into a liability to the estate, a remarkable feat in most places, but an easy task in Texas. The path through the courts is an interesting one that is all too representative of the tangled processing of Texas probate cases.

The first test for a Texas probate litigator is determining which court has jurisdiction. Many fail that test. The rules governing creditors claims are difficult and treacherous. The rules governing the interplay of jurisdiction, creditors claims, and independent administrations are almost impossible to follow. The best guidebook may be the classic tale of Alice in Wonderland. Clearly the spirit of Lewis Carroll is alive. As you read Columbia, ask yourself what the difference is between a dependent and independent administration of an estate. Feel free to be skeptical of the court's analysis of the concept of county court at law jurisdiction over independent executors.

“Appellant Columbia Rio Grande Regional Hospital, a medical provider, filed a declaratory action against Stover, independent executrix of the estate of Reed, deceased. Stover filed a motion for summary judgment asserting, inter alia, the action was barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. . . . We affirm.

“Columbia provided medical services to Reed for an on-the-job injury. Columbia charged Reed for services provided in the amount of $15,395.85, and later filed a hospital lien for that amount in Hidalgo County. 1[6] Subsequently, Reed filed suit against his employer in the 206th District Court in Hidalgo County (Reed Lawsuit). Columbia filed notice of its hospital lien in the Reed Lawsuit. 2[7] During the course of the lawsuit Reed died, and Stover filed an application to probate Reed's will. The probate court, County Court at Law No. 4, Hidalgo County, in Cause No. 25,040-D, appointed Stover independent executrix of Reed's estate. Stover stepped in as plaintiff in the Reed Lawsuit. When the lawsuit settled, the 206th District Court entered judgment whereby the defendant's insurer, Motors Insurance Corporation (Motors), agreed to tender to Stover the settlement amount of $135,000, out of which Columbia's hospital lien was to be satisfied, depending on the outcome of litigation between the estate and Columbia. Motors issued a $15,395.85 check payable to Stover's trustee and Columbia. Stover refused to sign the check over to Columbia and the district court placed the funds in its registry.

“At Stover's request, the district court ordered Motors' check transferred to the registry of the county court where the estate was being probated. Columbia then filed an authenticated claim for Reed's medical expenses in the probate proceeding. In response, Stover filed a motion to bar Columbia's claim asserting the claim did not attach to the estate or, alternately, the claim was untimely filed. The probate court granted Stover's motion.

“Contemporaneously with these proceedings, Columbia filed an original declaratory judgment action against Stover urging its rights pursuant to the hospital lien. Columbia's action was assigned the same cause number as the probate proceeding in County Court at Law No. 4. Stover answered, counterclaimed, and filed a motion for summary judgment based on the affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In her motion, Stover asserted Columbia's causes of action were barred because Columbia's claims had been adjudicated by either: (1) the judgment of the 206th District Court regarding Reed's personal injury cause of action; or (2) the order of the probate court barring Columbia's claim. Columbia responded and objected to Stover's summary judgment evidence. Columbia also filed a cross motion for summary judgment and amended its petition. Stover did not amend her motion.

“On January 26, 1998, by agreement of the parties, the probate court severed Columbia's action against Stover from the probate proceeding and assigned the severed action cause number 25,040-D-1. On February 3, 1998, the probate court granted Stover's summary judgment motion. The probate court did not rule on Columbia's cross motion for summary judgment. On February 10, 1998, Stover non-suited her counterclaim against Columbia.

“In addition to the foregoing litigation, Columbia filed suit against Motors in County Court at Law No. 3, asserting liability for paying over the hospital lien and for not paying the proceeds directly to Columbia. Motors filed an unopposed motion to consolidate Columbia's suit against Motors with cause number 25,040-D. The motion was granted on February 4, 1998.

“By points of error one and three Columbia complains that the summary judgment is not final because it does not dispose of all claims and parties. Columbia first asserts this appeal is taken from cause number 25,040-D, the cause into which its claims against Motors were consolidated. Columbia argues that because the summary judgment does not address its claims against Motors, it is interlocutory. In response, Stover asserts this appeal is from cause number 25,040-D-1, a cause severed out of 25,040-D. Stover contends because Columbia's claims against Motors were never before the trial court in the severed cause, she did not need to address them.

“We agree with Stover that the appeal is from case number 25,040-D-1. On January 26, 1998, the trial court signed an agreed order severing Columbia's cause of action against Stover from the probate proceeding, cause number 25,040-D, and assigning that action a new cause number, 25,040-D-1.[8] The court granted Stover's summary judgment in the severed action on February 3, 1998. The following day, February 4, 1998, Columbia's lawsuit against Motors was consolidated with the probate proceeding, cause number 25,040-D, not the severed cause. Columbia's claims against Motors were never before the trial court in cause number 25,040-D-1. As Motors was never a party to the severed lawsuit, it was not necessary for the summary judgment to address Columbia's claims against Motors.

“. . . Finally, Stover concedes that the order was interlocutory because the summary judgment order did not address Stover's counterclaims. The probate court, however, non-suited Stover's counterclaim on February 10, 1998, seven days after the entry of the summary judgment. Where an interlocutory order is entered disposing of the interests of less than all parties and claims, that order does not become final until a subsequent order is entered disposing of the remaining parties and claims.[9] Once an order has been entered disposing of all remaining parties and issues, all the orders merge, creating a final and appealable judgment.[10] Therefore, the probate court's summary judgment, interlocutory in nature when granted, became final on February 10, 1998, when the trial court disposed of Stover's counterclaim. Because we conclude the judgment from which Columbia appealed is a final judgment, this Court has jurisdiction to hear Columbia's appeal. . . .

“Res judicata prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that, with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the earlier suit.[11] The claim of res judicata requires proof of the following: (1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a second action based on the same claims as were raised or could have been raised in the first action.[12]

“We note at the outset that Columbia's brief contains no assertion that Stover failed to establish the identity of parties, the second element of res judicata. Further, while Columbia asserts Stover failed to establish the third element of res judicata, a second action based on the same claims as were raised or could have been raised in the first action, its brief contains no argument, supported by citations to authorities and the record, as to why its declaratory judgment action is not based on claims raised or claims that could have been raised.[13] Accordingly, Columbia's argument is restricted to its contention that Stover did not establish the first element of res judicata, a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction.

“Columbia first argues that there is no prior order adjudicating its claims. Columbia contends that the probate court had no jurisdiction to enter the order; therefore, the prior probate order granting Stover's motion to bar Columbia's lien in the probate proceeding is void. Columbia asserts that the probate order constitutes a nullity and cannot be the basis of a defense of res judicata.

“Columbia contends claim administration by an independent administrator is to be conducted in accordance with sections 145 and 146 of the Texas Probate Code without further action by the court. Columbia argues section 145(h) expressly denies the probate court jurisdiction in the administration of the estate, including claims administration. Stover asserts the probate court has jurisdiction pursuant to sections 5 and 5A of the code. Stover urges sections 5 and 5A must be read in conjunction with the last phrase of section 145(h) allowing for intervention where the code specifically provides for action in the probate court.

Section 145(h) of the probate code provides:

When an independent administration has been created, and the order appointing an independent executor has been entered by the county court, and the inventory, appraisement, and list aforesaid has been filed by the executor and approved by the county court, as long as the estate is represented by an independent executor, further action of any nature shall not be had in the county court except where this Code specifically and explicitly provides for some action in the county court.[14]

“While the general purpose of section 145 is to free the independent executor from the control of the court, except where the code specifically and explicitly provides otherwise,[15] it is equally clear that courts have determined the legislature did not intend for the independent administrator to be completely free from judicial supervision.[16] Because we conclude that section 145(h) does not deny a statutory county court jurisdiction over an independent administration, we look to code provisions that address probate jurisdiction in statutory county courts.

“The general jurisdiction of a statutory county court sitting in probate is described in sections 5 and 5A. The applicable provisions of section 5 include:

(c) In those counties where there is a statutory probate court, county court at law, or other statutory court exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court, all applications, petitions and motions regarding probate and administrations shall be filed and heard in such courts and the constitutional county court, rather than in the district courts, unless otherwise provided by the legislature, and the judges of such courts may hear any of such matters sitting for the judge of any of such courts. In contested matters, the judge of the constitutional county court may on his own motion, and shall on the motion of any party to the proceeding, transfer the proceeding to the statutory probate court, county court at law, or other statutory court exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court, which may then hear the proceeding as if originally filed in such court.

. . .

(e) All courts exercising original probate jurisdiction shall have the power to hear all matters incident to an estate.[17]

“Significantly, probate code section 5(c) states that all motions regarding probate and administrations shall be filed and heard in statutory county courts exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court. [18] Section 5(e) further provides those courts exercising original probate jurisdiction, which include statutory county courts pursuant to section 5(c), shall have the power to hear all matters incident to an estate.[19] This is a general grant of authority to statutory county courts. [20] Additionally, probate code section 5A(a) plainly states that in proceedings in statutory county courts at law, the phrase "incident to an estate" includes "all claims by or against an estate," and "generally all matters relating to the settlement, partition, and distribution of estates of deceased persons."[21] This statute codifies case law.[22]

“Columbia's reliance on Carter v. Brady[23] for the proposition that a probate court has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of claims against an estate being administered by an independent executor, is misplaced. Carter predates the legislature's 1973 modification of the jurisdictional framework for probate matters and case law interpreting those changes.[24] In English, the Texas Supreme Court recognized that the obvious purpose of the 1973 changes was "to increase the jurisdiction of such courts in 'matters incident to an estate' so that a decedent's estate could be more efficiently settled in one proceeding." [25] Subsequently, the legislature added section 5A to the code, further expanding statutory county court jurisdiction to matters including, "but not limited to, all claims by or against an estate . . , and generally all matters relating to the settlement, partition, and distribution of estates. . . ."[26] A probate court's jurisdiction has been greatly expanded since Carter.

“County Court at Law No. 4 in Hidalgo County, a statutory county court, appointed Stover independent executrix of Reed's estate pursuant to section 145, and administered the probate proceeding.[27] Columbia filed an authenticated claim in the probate court. Stover filed a motion in the court to bar Columbia's claim, a claim Stover believed to be barred because it did not attach to the estate or, alternately, because it was untimely filed. Columbia's claim was against the estate. The claim necessarily involved the assets of the estate. The outcome would have a direct bearing on the settlement, partition, and distribution of the estate. Accordingly, we conclude Stover's motion involved matters "incident to the estate," and the probate court had jurisdiction to hear Stover's motion. The probate court's order of September 24, 1997, granting Stover's motion to bar Columbia's claim is not void for lack of jurisdiction.

“The final order barring Columbia's claim was appealable to this Court.[28] [29] Because no direct appeal of the September 24, 1997, probate order was taken by Columbia, it cannot now attack the order collaterally.[30]

“Accordingly, we hold there was a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. Stover established the first element of res judicata, the only element about which Columbia complains. Therefore, the summary judgment is sustainable on that ground.

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Case #2 Garza v. Rodriguez

January 26, 2000 18 S.W.3d 694 (TexApp - San Antonio 2000)

For those who think that in Texas, real estate titles pass by the will itself, and not by an order of a probate court, Garza is very interesting indeed. Garza addresses a devise of real estate in fee simple subject to a springing executory interest that didn’t spring because an unexplained constitutional county court order of final probate settling, approving, and closing an estate granted fee simple absolute title and did not account for the springing executory interest expressly provided in the will. Garza does not discuss whether the issue was plead, litigated, considered by the county court prior to the probate court order or whether the constitutional county court had proper jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter. The court does not discuss the possibility that the order was a superfluous and erroneous attempt to recite the will provisions by the person who drafted the order and was clueless about the concept of a fee simple subject to a springing executory interest. It seems that the court had enough on its mind without those considerations.

“Appellants appeal from a dismissal order from the 229th District Court of Starr County, dismissing their suit to construe a previously probated will for want of jurisdiction. Because a court is not permitted to interfere with the final judgment of another court of equal jurisdiction, we affirm the trial court's order of dismissal.

“Appellants filed a declaratory action in the 229th District Court in Starr County to construe the previously probated will of their aunt Maria Lopez de Pena (hereinafter "Pena"), asserting that they are the legal owners of certain real property bequeathed in Pena's will. The property at issue consists of nine tracts of land, which have mineral interests. In their action, appellants also sought partition of the land to which they claim entitlement.

“Pena's will, executed on January 22, 1943, provided in relevant part:

It is my will that all the rest and residue of my property, both real and personal and of any nature and kind whatsoever, and wherever situated of which I shall die seized and possessed, shall pass to and be vested in fee simple title to my nephew, Santiago Rodriguez, Jr., son of my sister Eusebia Lopez de Rodriguez, to be owned and enjoyed by him with God's and my blessings forever. . . . But should he die without lawful issue of his body, then, and in that event, it is my will and wish that all of my aforesaid property shall pass to and be vested in fee simple in my sister, the said Eusebia Lopez de Rodriguez, her heirs and their descendants per stirpes.

“By this provision, Pena granted to Santiago a fee simple interest in her real property subject to a shifting executory interest in favor of Santiago's mother, Eusebia Lopez de Rodriguez, her heirs and their descendants per stirpes.

Pena died on June 1, 1956; her will was presented for probate the following week in the constitutional county court of Starr County. On July 29, 1957[31] [32] an order of final probate settling, approving, and closing Pena's estate was entered in the county court.[33] With respect to Santiago's interest, it provided that:

[T]he remainder of the lands owned by Maria Lopez de Pena, including all funds in the bank, as well as all real estate and personal property were bequeathed and given to Santiago Rodriguez, Jr. . . . .[34]

“The final probate order thus granted fee simple absolute title to the remainder of Pena's estate to Santiago; the final probate order did not account for the springing executory interest expressly stated in the will.[35]

“On October 19, 1984,[36] Santiago died intestate, survived by his wife, Olivia Olivarez Rodriguez, and one adopted son, Gabriel Rodriguez. Because Santiago died without lawful issue, appellants, Eusebia Lopez de Rodriguez's heirs, concluded that they became the legal owners of the real property Pena conditionally devised to Santiago through the 1943 will.

“On July 8, 1986, appellants filed a declaratory action in the 229th district court of Starr County, asking the court to construe the will of Pena to declare them the legal and beneficial owners of Pena's property due to the springing executory interest, which they claim divested Santiago of his ownership. Appellants also requested the district court to partition the subject property among them. At the time of this filing, no probate matter concerning either Pena's estate or Santiago's estate was pending. On August 4, 1986, appellees filed a declaration of heirship in the county court at law[37] of Starr County. That same day, appellees also filed in the district court their original answer and a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which the trial court later granted. . . .

“Appellants argue that the district court erred in dismissing their suit to construe Pena's will because the district court has concurrent jurisdiction with the county court over matters "incident to an estate" when, as here, a probate matter is not pending in the county court. Construction of a will and issues of title are matters incident to an estate; thus, the district court had jurisdiction over the matters because the county court's probate jurisdiction had not been invoked.[38] Appellants further assert that the district court had jurisdiction to act because their pleadings requested the imposition of a constructive trust.[39]

“Appellees counter that the trial court properly dismissed the underlying action because in counties such as Starr County, where there is a county court at law exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court, all probate matters shall be filed and heard in such courts and the constitutional county court, rather than in the district courts.[40] Appellees note that in section 5(c) counties, district court jurisdiction may be invoked by a proper transfer or by pleadings that clearly set out a cause of action and request for relief which the county court at law exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court cannot provide.[41] Appellees note that the instant case does not involve a transfer situation; thus, they contend the district court's jurisdiction could be invoked only if appellants sought relief which the probate court could not grant. Appellees further argue that because the county court[42] previously acquired jurisdiction over Pena's estate, the district court would be without authority to consider an attack on the county court's probate order.

“County courts have the general jurisdiction of a probate court.[43] In most counties in Texas, the constitutional county courts ("county courts") act as the probate court.[44] As a probate court, county courts are empowered to: [P]robate wills, grant letters testamentary and of administration, settle accounts of personal representatives, and transact all business appertaining to estates subject to administration or guardianship, including the settlement, partition, and distribution of such estates.[45] Historically, a probate court did not have the power to construe provisions of a will or decide matters of title because such matters were considered outside the purview of probate matters; they were considered matters incident to an estate.[46] The construction of a will or issues of title were thus general civil matters within the jurisdictional reach of the district courts.[47] [48]

“In 1973,[49] the county court's probate jurisdiction was expanded when the Legislature undertook a two-step reform of probate jurisdiction.