Texas - Probate of Wills That Are Altered or Interlined

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© A. Hawkins 2004

Suitability

This course may be taken by any lawyer, but is especially important for those who are serious about the topic. The introductory course should be taken before this course. 0This course covers topics that frequently appear at the core of the plots in books and movies. The cases are fundamentally interesting and entertaining.

Scope

This course is one of a cluster of courses that cover all[1] reported Texas cases since 1950 on missing and lost Wills as well as Wills that have been altered after execution. The material is divided into five separate courses to make each course a reasonable length. This also allows you to take one course at a time as your schedule permits and gradually become a KnowItAll.

Wills with removed or substituted pages and interlined, mutilated, damaged, destroyed, partially obliterated pages are interesting creations. This course is about altered Wills. At one time, there was a valid Will. At least part of the original Will exists at death, but is has been altered after execution. A bequest might have been added by an interlineation or insertion of a new page. A name might be added or stuck out. A page might be added, removed, or substituted for a prior page. The act might have been the act of the testator. The identity of the person who did it might not be known. The Will might be holographic or mechanically printed, with holographic or mechanically printed alterations.

This is a case study course. Cases are kept intact rather being chopped up and quoted or cited issue by issue. Cases typically involve several issues, but are grouped under one of those issues. Be aware that other issues are often present. As a result, some cases that involve a particular issue will be grouped under a different issue. The court opinions are lightly edited[2] to retain the full flavor and context.

Prior to each court opinion, the teacher provides italicized commentary.

The Process

1. Study this text.

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This course is primarily a case study which relies on the words of the courts which are quoted so that you may read them yourself. The teacher has selected quotations, deleted original emphasis, added the authors emphasis, and moved citations to footnotes. Commentary by the teacher is included in the text and in footnotes. Five asterisks ( * * * * * ) identify each new case, If a case doesn’t interest you, just search for * * * * * to find the next one. This also helps if you wish to go back to reread a case.

There are three kinds of footnotes.

1. Footnotes by the court retain the court’s original number. Our footnote is a footnote to that number.

2. Footnotes that move citations to the footnotes are intended to make the material more readable. Our footnote has the court’s citations.

3. Footnotes that contain some of the author’s commentary.

If you read this course online, your browser will probably let you click on a footnote number to go to the footnote and click on the number in the footnote to return to the text. Some browsers will show the footnote if you hold your curser over the footnote number without clicking If you print the text, you may wish to staple the footnotes separately so you may easily refer to them. They are at the end because of technicalities of the internet. This is a Microsoft Word document displayed as a web page. You may copy it into a word processor to print it if you like. If you have any problems, let us know.

Optional Telephone Conference

The teacher is available for an optional personal telephone conference on the substance of this course. If you have a question about the application of the material in this course to a particular case, or would just like to visit about this topic, you may do so. A brief basic phone conference is $20 per course. If you would like to schedule a phone conference, email or call YouKnowItAll.com.

Table of Contents

A combined table of contents for this course and the lost Will courses is in a separate document. A table of contents for Altered Wills is also in this document.

Table of Contents Altered Wills

Preface - What is a Will?

Hinson v. Hinson 280 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1955)

What is an interlined Will.

Commentary

The essence of the Texas law of interlined Wills.

Commentary

Interlined Wills.

Huckaby v. Huckaby 436 S.W.2d 601 (Tex Civ App - Houston (1st Dist.] 1968)

Freeman v. Chick 252 S.W.2d 763 (TexCivApp-Austin 1952)

Schoenhals v. Schoenhals 366 S.W.2d 594 (Tex Civ App -Amarillo 1963)

Scott v. Schwartz 469 S.W.2d 587 (TexCivApp- San Antonio 1971)

Wills With Pages Removed, Inserted, or Substituted

Pullen v. Russ 209 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1948, writ ref’d n.r.e.)

Douglas v. Winkle 623 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.App. - Texarkana 1981)

Mahan v. Dovers 730 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.App. - Ft. Worth 1987)

Goode v. Hoover 828 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992)

In re Estate of Flores, Deceased March 28, 2002 (Tex.App. - Corpus Christi - Edinburg 2002) (Flores is in the introductory course.)

Obliterations by Striking Through

Estate of Montgomery 881 S.W.2d 750 (Tex.App. - Tyler 1994)

Holographic Obliteration

Hancock v. Krause 757 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1988

City of Austin v. The Austin National Bank 488 S.W.2d 586 (Tex.Civ.App. - Austin 1972) affirmed in this respect, reversed in part on other grounds, 503 S.W. 2d 759 (Tex. 1974)

Obliteration by Ink Blotch

Leatherwood v. Stephens, 13 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1929), aff’d, 24 S.W.2d 819 (Tex.Comm’n App. 1930) (with dissent)

Leatherwood v. Stephens 24 S.W.2d 819 (Tex.Comm’n App. 1930) (same case )

Alphabetical Case List

City of Austin v. The Austin National Bank 488 S.W.2d 586 (Tex.Civ.App. - Austin 1972) affirmed in this respect, reversed in part on other grounds, 503 S.W. 2d 759 (Tex. 1974)

Douglas v. Winkle 623 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.App. - Texarkana 1981)

In re Estate of Flores, Deceased March 28, 2002 (Tex.App. - Corpus Christi - Edinburg 2002)

Freeman v. Chick 252 S.W.2d 763 (TexCivApp-Austin 1952)

Goode v. Hoover 828 S.W.2d 558 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992)

Hancock v. Krause 757 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] 1988

Hinson v. Hinson 280 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1955)

Huckaby v. Huckaby 436 S.W.2d 601 (Tex Civ App - Houston (1st Dist.] 1968)

Leatherwood v. Stephens, 13 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco 1929), aff’d, 24 S.W.2d 819 (Tex.Comm’n App. 1930) (with dissent)

Leatherwood v. Stephens 24 S.W.2d 819 (Tex.Comm’n App. 1930) (same case )

Mahan v. Dovers 730 S.W.2d 467 (Tex.App. - Ft. Worth 1987)

Estate of Montgomery 881 S.W.2d 750 (Tex.App. - Tyler 1994)

Pullen v. Russ 209 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1948, writ ref’d n.r.e.)

Schoenhals v. Schoenhals 366 S.W.2d 594 (Tex Civ App -Amarillo 1963)

Scott v. Schwartz 469 S.W.2d 587 (TexCivApp- San Antonio 1971)

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The Course Text.

Texas - Probate of Wills That Are Altered or Interlined (2003)

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Preface - What is a Will?

Hinson is an important Texas Supreme Court case which provides background for the study of cases involving alterations of Wills.

Hinson v. Hinson 280 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. 1955)

“Respondent is the widow, and petitioner is the child by a former marriage, of J. W. Hinson, Sr., who died in Harris County on September 16, 1952. We are required to determine whether two instruments executed by the decedent are entitled to probate, either separately or together, as his last will and testament.

“On April 20, 1951, the decedent signed a printed and typewritten instrument, containing a formal introductory paragraph declaring the same to be his last will and testament, wherein he directed the payment of his debts, devised and bequeathed all of his property to respondent for her lifetime, and at her death to be divided equally between petitioner and two other named persons, provided that one-third of the estate should be given to petitioner in the event of respondent's remarriage, conferred upon respondent the power of sale, appointed executors, and revoked all former wills. This instrument also bears the signature and seal of a notary public but is not otherwise attested.

“Thereafter the decedent wrote his own handwriting and signed the following on a sheet of hotel stationery:

'Aug. 24, 1951

'Supplementary to my Last Will, it still stands as is.

'to my wife Ethel Mae Hinson. my will is in brief case zipper comp. Copy to wife. Copy to my son J. W. Hinson Jr. Everything is yours Darling. Pay the Home off. Sell my car. Have will probated at once. Go to Judge Ewing Boyd, tell him who you are. He will give you all legal advice needed. He is my friend. Sell all of my guns & things you do not need. Sell the Home if you like. But buy another one where you wish to live. Take care of everything I leave you will need it all.

'I love you Darling so much more than my own life. Bye. J. W. Hinson.'

“After the death of her husband, respondent filed in the County Court an application to probate in which she prayed that both writings, or in the alternative the handwritten instrument alone, be admitted to probate as the last will and testament of the decedent. Petitioner contested the application, contending that neither instrument is entitled to probate, because the first is not attested as required by law and because the second was not executed by the decedent with testamentary intent. The judgment of the County Court admitting both instruments to probate having been appealed, the cause was tried de novo in the District Court without the intervention of a jury, the only evidence introduced being the two instruments and certain facts stipulated by the parties. Testamentary capacity was admitted, and there was no question of fraud or undue influence. The parties agreed that the typewritten instrument dated April 20th was in existence in its present form at all times since that date, was found in a separate compartment of decedent's brief case after his death exactly as indicated in the handwritten instrument, and is the document to which reference is made in the latter instrument. The District Court sustained petitioner’s contentions with respect to the formal typewritten document, and entered a judgment probating only the holographic instrument dated August 24th. This judgment has been affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals.[3] It is our opinion that neither instrument can be probated.

“An instrument is not a will unless it is executed with testamentary intent. The animus testandi does not depend upon the maker’s realization that he is making a will, or upon his designation of the instrument as a will, but upon his intention to create a revocable disposition of his property to take effect after his death. It is essential, however, that the maker shall have intended to express his testamentary wishes in the particular instrument offered for probate.[4]

“The instrument offered for probate in the Caywood case was a letter written by a Navy pilot to his mother which contained the statement ‘You see my Will is made out to you and sister so this will be easy for you to get if I was to have a little hard luck.’[5] The judgment of the District Court admitting the letter to probate was reversed and rendered by the Court of Civil Appeals, which said:

‘So, in the instant case, if the deceased meant only to say that he had executed a will and to state to whom he had disposed of his property in such will, then the language used would not constitute a will. * * *’

The court concluded that the writer intended that his mother and sister would receive his property not by the provisions of the letter but by the terms of the will that he said he had previously executed.

In Langehennig v. Hohmann,[6] the decedent left a will giving all property to his wife in fee simple. The husband and wife had also executed in the presence of witnesses a formal instrument which recited that the parties had theretofore made their wills ‘and which are and shall be and remain in full force and effect as heretofore executed.’ There were then a number of provisions expressing the ‘wish and desire’ of the parties as to how the survivor should manage and dispose of the estate. It was held that the writing was an expression of the wishes, but not of the will, of the husband and wife and should not be admitted to probate. In support of this conclusion it was said:

‘That this is the true meaning of the instrument is evidenced also by the declaration in mandatory language that the wills already made shall remain in full force and effect as executed. The will of William Hohmann could not remain in full force and effect if the later writing had been intended as a codicil, for the codicil would modify the will or revoke it in part by bequeathing to the children, either by direct bequest or by the creation of a trust in their favor, a part of his property, all of which had been willed to his wife. Thus the writing, if construed as testamentary, would be contradictory in its own provisions. When it is construed as an instrument of recommendation or advice it is not contradictory of itself and all of its provisions are given effect.’

“We agree with respondent that the decedent intended to make a testamentary disposition of his property. It is our opinion, however, that the holographic instrument of August 24th was not intended as a declaration of the manner in which he would have his property pass and vest at his death. He had previously signed an instrument which he expressly declared to be his last will and testament and which the parties agree is the ‘will’ referred to in the informal memorandum. The latter instrument begins with the words ‘Supplementary to my last will and testament, it still stands as is.’ This clearly negatives any intention to revoke or modify any of the provisions of the typewritten instrument. At the very outset, the decedent conveys the idea that he has something in mind other than the making of a testamentary disposition of his property. He has already executed an instrument which he thinks is a legal will, and ‘it still stands as is.’ He then tells his wife ‘my will is in brief case zipper comp.,’ which obviously was not intended to refer to the instrument which he was then writing. Later he advises her to have the will probated at once and suggests that she go to Judge Ewing Boyd for legal advice.

“It should also be observed that the decedent had some knowledge of the form and wording of a will. The introduction to the typewritten instrument expressly declares the same to be his last will and testament. In the body of this ‘will’ he used the words ‘give, devise and bequeath’ and ‘it is my will,’ directed the payment of debts, appointed executors and revoked former wills. The holographic instrument does not affirmatively state that it is intended or declared to be a will and does not contain language ordinarily used to make a disposition of property. While this circumstance is not controlling, it tends to support our conclusion as to the decedent’s purpose in executing the informal memorandum.

“The statement ‘Everything is yours Darling’ in an instrument properly executed and intended as a will might be effectual to pass the decedent's property.[7] We are not permitted, however, to lift such statement out of context, but must consider the same in the light of all the provisions of the instrument. The introductory sentence clearly indicates that the decedent intended that his property should pass and vest under and in accordance with the provisions of the typewritten instrument. By the terms of that ‘will’ his wife took a life estate with power of sale. It is not reasonable to believe, therefore, that the statement ‘Everything is yours Darling’ was intended to operate as a devise of the property to her. We think it is apparent from a reading of the entire instrument that this sentence was written by the decedent for the purpose of informing the respondent that he had devised his property to her. The remaining provisions regarding the preservation of the property and the sale of various items thereof are in the nature of suggestions and advice to the wife for her guidance in the management of the estate he had attempted to devise to her by the ‘will.’

“Respondent argues that the existence of testamentary intent presents a question of fact, and that we are bound by the implied finding of the trial judge that the holographic instrument was intended as a will. As stated in Brackenridge v. Roberts,[8] ‘where the evidence is not conclusive of the existence or nonexistence of such an intention, and where its existence or non-existence is to be deducted from all the facts and circumstances of the case, the issue must be determined by the jury.’ When such a case is tried before the Court, the finding of the trial judge on the question would be conclusive. It is our opinion, however, that the evidence in this case conclusively establishes as a matter of law that the decedent intended that his property should pass and vest not by the provisions of the informal memorandum but under the in accordance with the terms of typewritten instrument. Under these circumstances the holographic instrument standing alone cannot be admitted to probate.

“Respondent also contends that the typewritten instrument is republished by, or incorporated by reference in, the holographic writing and thus is validated, and that the two instruments, taken together, should be admitted to probate as the decedent's will. Petitioner concedes that the handwritten document evidences the intention of the decedent to republish or incorporate by reference the earlier typewritten instrument.

“The doctrine of incorporation by reference has been recognized by at least one Court of Civil Appeals and by a statement in one of our early opinions, but we do not find that it has been expressly approved by a decision of this court.[9] It is well settled, however, that a properly executed and valid codicil which contains a sufficient reference to a prior will, operates as a republication of the will in so far as it is not altered or revoked by the codicil; the will and codicil are then to be regarded as one instrument speaking from the date of the codicil.[10] Most jurisdictions in which the question has arisen also hold that a properly executed codicil validates a prior will which was inoperative or invalid because of defective execution, lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence.[11] We note that the latter rule is recognized by implication in Campbell v. Barrera[12] and will assume for the purpose of this opinion that such rule does obtain in Texas. This brings us to the question which we regard as controlling in the present case.

“Art. 8283 Tex.Civ.Stat. provides that a will ‘shall, if not wholly in the handwriting of the testator, be attested by two or more credible witnesses above the age of fourteen years, subscribing their names thereto in their own handwriting in the presence of the testator.’ The handwritten instrument of August 24th appears on its face to be attested by three witnesses, but the parties have stipulated that the signatures of two of the witnesses were placed on the instrument after the decedent’s death and the record is silent as to when or under what circumstances the other witness signed. The writing is simply a signed but unattested holograph. We must decide, therefore, whether an unattested non-holographic instrument may be validated by a subsequently executed and unattested holographic document.

“In Adams v. Maris[13] the trial court admitted to probate an envelope on which was written the words ‘Henry Boyce’ and ‘Notes,’ a holographic instrument stating ‘ ‘Henry, please except this you & F. Y. Adams for the kindness shown me. E. Vanlaw,’ ’ and a promissory note found in the envelope, which note was on a printed form with the blanks completed in the handwriting of the testator. The Commission of Appeals concluded that the note was not incorporated in the handwritten instrument, but in the course of the opinion said:

‘The statutes relating to wills require that a written will be attested by two witnesses unless wholly written by the testator. Manifestly, then, if the note referred to is considered a part of the letter of the deceased, the papers admitted to probate must fail as a will, not being attested, and the note being written partly in script and partly in the handwriting of the deceased.’

“There is a divergence of view in other jurisdictions on this question. Among the cases holding that an unattested non-holographic instrument cannot be validated by incorporation or republication in or by an unattested holograph are Scott v. Gastright, 305 Ky. 340, 204 S.W.2d 367, 173 A.L.R. 565 (incorporation); Sharp v. Wallace, 83 Ky. 584 (republication); Hewes v. Hewes, 110 Miss. 826, 71 So. 4 (incorporation); and Gibson v. Gibson, 28 Grat. 44, 69 Va. 44 (republication). The following is an excerpt from the opinion in Scott v. Gastright:

‘We cannot, however, carry the doctrine (of incorporation by reference) so far as to nullify the provision of our statute which requires a holographic will to be wholly written by the testator. If appellee’s theory is sound, it would authorize a person to validate a forty page printed, or typewritten, instrument as a will by simply writing at the end thereof, ‘The above is my will’ and signing such statement.’

“The cases of Johnson v. Johnson, Okl., 279 P.2d 928, and Rogers v. Agricola, 176 Ark. 287, 3 S.W.2d 26, hold to the contrary, the courts apparently relying entirely on the broad principle that a validly executed codicil operates as a republication of the will. The opinions do not undertake to explain or justify the probate of an unattested non-holographic instrument and do not discuss the provisions of the applicable statutes.

This is not a case in which the extrinsic-document is referred to simply for the purpose of identifying the beneficiaries of the will or the property devised thereby, or of ascertaining the intention of the testator in some collateral matter, or of resolving an ambiguity resulting from the language used in the will. The typewritten paper of April 20th is the operative testamentary instrument; without it no part of the decedent's scheme or plan for the disposition of his property can be ascertained. We must look to that document to determine the very substance of his testamentary wishes, including the property devised, the identity of the beneficiaries, the estates devised to each, the powers of the life tenant, and the names of the executors. Even if such instrument is regarded as having been incorporated in or republished by the later handwritten memorandum and the two documents are considered together, we are still confronted with the fact that the instrument offered for probate is not wholly in the handwriting of the decedent and is not attested as required by statute. It is our conclusion, therefore, that under the clear provisions of our statute the two instruments involved in this case cannot be admitted to probate.”

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What is an interlined Will?

Interlineation is the term for revising a document by marking the revisions on it. It refers to writing between the lines, although the concept is not restricted to that precise method of editing. For example, a will may be typed or printed with the following bequest:

“I give my cat to Jen.”

It might be then be edited in pen or pencil to read as follows:

“I give my 50 pound solid gold cat figurine to Jen.”

It might also be edited by a typewriter to read as follows:

50 pound solid gold

“I give my/cat to Jen.”

That is interlineation. An interlineated or interlined Will is a Will which has such interlineations. Interlineated Wills are invariably written Wills.[14]

An interlineation may accompany an erasure. It might be an erasure and an interlineation that changes “I give my cat to Jen” to “I give my cat to Jan” or “I give my 50 pound solid gold cat to Jan.”

Interlineation may be hard to read, or hard to interpret, but that is not the issue of this course. For this course, we assume that there is a clear meaning and intention expressed before the change and that the interlineation changes that meaning.

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The essence of the Texas Law of Interlined Wills

The issues created by interlined Wills are not as different from the issues created by a standard written Will as might be suspected. The issues revolve around whether a Will was executed, amended, or revoked in compliance with the statutes, and if so, what the Will contains. The following factual issues might arise.

* Was the Will interlined before or after execution?

* Did the testator know that the Will was interlined when executing it?

* Did the interlineation constitute a revocation by destruction?

* If it was interlined after execution, is the interlineation a codicil or revocation?

*Was the testator the one who made the interlineation?

*Was it entirely in the hand of the testator?

*Was it intended to be a codicil?

*Is it coherent as a codicil?

*Was it intended to be a revocation?

A key to the analysis of an interlined Will is the recognition that the standard rules of Will execution and revocation apply. Any analysis must fit those standard rules.

A second key is that the interlineation may be a fraudulent act by someone other than the testator, or may appear to be a fraudulent act even if it is not one. When the courts perceive fraud, their attitude and analysis may easily reflect their preference for a result that thwarts the fraud. When reading cases, one should seek a sense of “what really happened” and what the court thinks “really happened” to see if the court is reaching the result it seeks, rather than the result dictated by law. An example is the Huckaby Estate[15] in which the brother of the deceased seems to have caused the court of appeals to suspect that he acted improperly. Among other facts, the court of appeals recites that he used “profane language.”[16]

In Huckaby, erasure, substitution and interlineation benefited the brother at the expense of the son. The jury found that those editing changes were not made before the Will was executed. If the editing was not done before execution, the Will as edited is not a Will. The Will as executed is still the Will if it was not revoked or amended. In Huckaby, the court found intestacy. The son received everything. The brother who used profanity received nothing.

For those who suspect that the brother tampered with the Will to divert the estate from the son to the brother, the result may seem just. It is that natural preference for a “just” result which can influence juries and judges. If the executed Will, before editing, gave everything to the son, the result of intestacy is the same and intestacy is an easy way to achieve the “just” answer. In Huckaby, intestacy may also be the technically correct answer, but recognize that courts are receptive to results that favor the spouse and children rather than a brother or mistress, especially if the spouse or children seem nice and the brother or mistress seem evil. Beneficiaries who are also heirs and natural objects of the bounty of the deceased are more likely to be well treated by the court. We quote extensively from the Huckaby case to get a sense of the kind of facts which the court recites.

The language used in interlined wills can be difficult to comprehend. If it doesn’t make sense, you may wish to read it, reread and return to it after reading what the court has to say about it.

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Interlined Will Cases

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Issues: Interlineation, erasure, and substitution occured after Will execution. The teacher provides commentary in italics with wide margins within the opinion.

Huckaby v. Huckaby 436 S.W.2d 601 (Tex Civ App - Houston (1st Dist.] 1968)

“By paragraph I specific property is given to Mrs. Katie L. Huckaby. As a part of the last line of paragraph I is the following language and immediately below is paragraph II all in the following form:

'I also bequeath all personal and real property at my death

II.

'To my beloved brother, Arthur L. Huckaby. All interest I have in the (sic) business known as Huckaby Funeral Service, equipment, Funeral Coaches, and, the interest I hold in the Fireside Burial Association.'

“The jury, on sufficient evidence, found that the words ‘I also bequeath all personal and real property’ were not contained in the Will when it was signed by the testator on October 18, 1953.

“Paragraph VII provided: ‘My personal car shall be given to my beloved brother, Arthur L. Huckaby.’

“It is obvious to the naked eye that there had been an erasure where the words ‘brother, Arthur L.’ appear.

“The jury, on sufficient evidence, found that the words ‘son, Leon Mitchell’ had not been erased prior to the execution[17] of the Will and replaced by the words ‘brother, Arthur L.’

The trial court, based on a jury verdict, denied probate on the theory that the Will had been revoked. The Court of Appeals noted that the interlineation, editing and substitution did not revoke the Will, and initially decided to remand for retrial based on the refusal of the trial court to instruct the jury on the meaning of the term “revocation” since the jury might have believed that the alteration, interlineation, and substitution constituted revocation.

“The term ‘revocation’ as used in connection with wills has a legal meaning. It is not a term of common understanding that need not be defined.

“In this case it is especially harmful not to have given the definition because the jury might well have thought that the two changes made in the will constituted a revocation in law. That such is not true is held[18] in Leatherwood et al. v. Stephens et al.[19]”

On rehearing, the court of appeals affirmed on the theory that the definition of “revocation” in the requested jury instruction was misleading since the editing could not have revoked the Will, even if done by the deceased.

“Since the requested explanatory instruction included the statement that a will or a devise therein could be revoked by ‘cancellation’, the jury might reasonably conclude that these changes in the will were a revocation through cancellation. Yet we know such is not true under the cases cited in the last paragraph of our original opinion.

“We remain of the view that a proper explanatory instruction on how a will can be revoked should be given on proper request.” [20]

An alternative analysis was available to the court. After the execution of the Will which was altered, there is evidence of a Will which left everything to Leon. The jury could have believed that the subsequent Will revoked the altered Will. Since the later Will was not produced, and was last seen in the possession of the decedent, it may be considered a missing Will which was presumed to have been revoked by destruction, resulting in intestacy.[21] This achieves the “just” result of intestacy in a technically acceptable manner. If the Will which named Leon was actually the altered Will and that Will was altered after it was shown to people by the decedent, intestacy is not the legally correct result because the Will is not missing, but intestacy is a "just" result since Leon gets the estate.