Texas Slayers Rule: May A Killer Receive Insurance Benefits

Texas Slayers Rule: May A Killer Receive Insurance Benefits? #1 (2003)

YouKnowItAll.com

Suitability

This course is suitable for all lawyers. The concepts are not technical. No special background is required. The cases are interesting. The Slayer’s Rule forms the core of many books and movie plots. The Slayer’s Rule is a crossover topic that affects estate and criminal lawyers and those who litigate the Slayer’s Rule cases in civil courts. Insurance lawyers will find this topic interesting. Lawyers who are contemplating murdering, or being murdered by, their relatives will find it especially important. That is not as far fetched as it seems. A shocking number of Texas Slayer’s Rule cases result from killings committed by lawyers. What would Shakespeare think of that?

The Essence of the Slayer’s Rule

The essence of the Slayer’s Rule is that a person who intentionally and wrongfully causes the death of another person may not benefit from the death by receiving property as a result of the death. The Slayer’s Rule is not a “rule” in the technical sense of the word. It is a blend of common law and statutory law.

The Slayer’s Rule Cluster of Courses

This is one of a cluster of courses on the Texas Slayer’s Rule. The Slayers’s Rule determines if someone who causes the death of another may receive an inheritance, life insurance, or other property as a result of the death. This is course #1 of two courses which concentrates on life insurance benefits. A separate course concentrates on the right to an inheritance or other assets that are not life insurance. The material overlaps so all of the courses are required for a complete knowledge of either category of assets. These courses combine to provide a comprehensive review of the Texas Slayer’s Rule.

The Process

1. Study this text.

2. When you finish this text, go to www.YouKnowItAll.com to observe the discussion. There, you may choose to ask questions or make comments, or you may choose to just observe any discussion posted by others.

3. Keep track of your actual study hours and dates. After you complete your study, you certify your actual study hours at www.YouKnowItAll.com and you choose to whether to pay by check or credit card. Study time counts. Procedural and administrative time does not count. You receive credit for the actual study time you put in, based on your certification, up to the maximum for the course. Tuition is similar. If your actual study time is more than the maximum, your tuition is capped at the maximum. If your actual study time is less than the maximum, tuition is calculated based on your actual study time, at $20 per hour. Please certify your actual study time even if it is above the maximum. This allows us to better calibrate our courses, and helps the MCLE regulators recognize the real time you spend in your study.

4. YouKnowItAll.com provides a certificate of your attendance with the course name, course number, and the CLE credit hours you earned. If you are in the Texas bar, we report your credit to the State Bar of Texas. If you are in another bar and need something else, let us know.

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This course is primarily a case study which relies on the words of the courts which are quoted so that you may read them yourself. The teacher has selected quotations, deleted original emphasis, added the authors emphasis, and moved citations to footnotes. Commentary by the teacher is included in the text and in footnotes. Five asterisks ( * * * * * ) identify each new case, If a case doesn’t interest you, just search for * * * * * to find the next one. This also helps if you wish to go back to reread a case.

There are three kinds of footnotes.

1. Footnotes by the court retain the court’s original number.Our footnote is a footnote to that number.

2. Footnotes that move citations to the footnotes are intended to make the material more readable. Our footnote has the court’s citations.

3. Footnotes that contain some of the author’s commentary.

If you read this course online, your browser will probably let you click on a footnote number to go to the footnote and click on the number in the footnote to return to the text. Some browsers will show the footnote if you hold your curser over the footnote number without clicking If you print the text, you may wish to staple the footnotes separately so you may easily refer to them. They are at the end because of technicalities of the internet. This is a Microsoft Word document displayed as a web page. You may copy it into a word processor to print it if you like. If you have any problems, let us know.

Optional Telephone Conference

The teacher is available for an optional personal telephone conference on the substance of this course. If you have a question about the application of the material in this course to a particular case, or would just like to visit about this topic, you may do so. A brief basic phone conference is $20 per course. If you would like to schedule a phone conference, email or call YouKnowItAll.com.

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Table of Contents

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Course #1

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Introduction

The Essence of the Slayer’s Rule

I Give You No Reason to Kill Me

The Scope of This Course

Case Study Method

Issues Explored in This Course

Texas Courts and the Slayer’s Rule

The Insurance Company as a Victim

A Windfall

A Radical Idea

Texas Constitution

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

Texas Probate Code

Texas Insurance Code

Historic Cases

Mutual Life v. Mellott 57 S.W. 887 (Tex.Civ.App. 1900)

Murchison v. Murchison 203 S.W. 423 (Tex.Civ.App. - Beaumont 1918)

National Life v. Thompson 153 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.Civ.App. - Waco 1941)

The Leading Cases - Greer and Bounds.

Greer v. Franklin Life Insurance 221 S.W.2d 857 (Tex. 1949)

Bounds v. Caudle 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977)

Out of Bounds - The Retrial

Bounds v. Caudle 611 S.W.2d 685 (Tex.App. - Corpus Christi 1980)

The Supreme Court takes the wrong turn

at the nearest relatives or contingent beneficiary fork.

Deveroex v. Nelson 529 S.W.2d 510 (Tex 1975)

[Overruled in Crawford v. Coleman 726 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. 1987)]

Crawford v. Coleman 701 S.W.2d 79 (Tex.App. - Ft. Worth 1985)

The Supreme Court Reverses Direction

Crawford v. Coleman 726 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. 1987) [Overruling Deveroex]

The Legislature Responds - Named Contingent Beneficiaries Win Again

Willfulness

Seedig v. Dennis 701 S.W.2d 354 (Tex.App. Ft. Worth 1986)

A Ship of Fools Takes on Crawford

Rumbaut v. Labagnara 791 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Cir.] 1990)

Self Defense justifies slaying.

Giles v. Wiggins 442 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ.App. - Ft. Worth 1969)

Choice of law, Criminal to civil Collateral estoppel, and the Best Opinion.

American National v. Huckleberry 638 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Tex, Dallas 1986)

The Iran collateral estoppel blonde defense.

Cooley v. Cooley 503 S.W.2d 604 (Tex.Civ.App. - Eastland 1973)

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Course #2

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Is the Slayer Crazy & Rich, or Is the Law Crazy

Simon v. Dibble 380 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App. - San Antonio 1964)

Hair v. Pennsylvania Life 533 S.W.2d 387 (Tex.Civ.App. - Beaumont 1975)

Slayer’s Rule attorney’s fees, contingent fees, and guardianship.

Dopps v. Dopps 636 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.App. - Corpus Christi 1982)

The Conviction is Vacated. The Accused Slayer Is Innocent. So What?

Mowbray v. Avery April 11, 2002 (Tex.App. - Corpus Christi 2002)

Conspiracy to Slay

Guevara v. Guevara March 22, 2000 Not Published No. 04-99-00584 -CV (Tex.App. - San Antonio 2000)

Abusive Sanctions

In re Guevara January 10, 2001 (Tex.App. - San Antonio 2001)

Francis v. Marshall 841 S.W.2d 51 (Tex.App. - Houston [14th Dist.] 1992)

Is it Insurance? Does Other Law Trump § 21.23

Nelson v. DISD 774 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.App. - Dallas 1989)

Metropolitan Life Insurance v. White 972 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1992)

Interpleader & Venue

A Little Quarrel.

McCormick v. Southwestern Life 35 S.W. 2d 502 (Tex.Civ.App. -Waco 1931)

Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Helton 278 S.W.2d 352 (Tex.Civ.App. - Amarillo 1954)

Insurance Code Article 3.62, Good Faith, Penalty, Fees, & Interpleader

Murray v. Bankers Life Company 299 S.W.2d 730 ( Tex. Civ. App. -Ft. Worth 1957)

Gabler v. Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance 498 S.W.2d 413 (Tex.Civ.App. - Texarkana 1973)

Great American Reserve v. Sanders 525 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. 1975)

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The Course Text - Texas Slayers Rule: May A Killer Receive Insurance Benefits?

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Introduction

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The Essence of the Slayer’s Rule

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I Give You No Reason to Kill Me

There is a fundamental concept underlying the Slayer’s Rule. Everyone can understand the concept. Everyone can have an opinion of what the law should be. It is based on what is right and wrong, and what we want in our lives. Those who create and interpret the rule can’t help but think about it in these basic and personal ways. The Slayer’s Rule is a compilation of the concepts that have developed as people decided what they would like the rule to be in their lives.

A legislator, when considering a proposed Slayer’s Rule law, and a judge, when construing a Slayer’s Rule law or evolving the Slayer’s Rule common law, inevitably thinks about what he or she wants if he or she is the insured who is slayed. They also think about what they want if their parent, spouse, child, uncle, or friend is slayed. Attitudes are fairly consistent, at least on the basic issues. For example, if your child kills you, do you want that child to receive your estate or insurance death benefit? Probably not.

Another concept is not discussed in the cases but may be even more compelling. Do you want your child to have a financial motive to kill you? That question is easy. The answer is no. Your child might kill you for other reasons, but giving your child a financial benefit as an incentive to kill you is not a comfortable thought. While the Slayer’s Rule is spoken of after the fact as being about whether the slayer benefits from the killing, the underlying issue that isn’t mentioned in cases is whether the judge’s child or spouse will benefit from killing the judge in the future.[1] In a sense, the Slayer’s Rule is a form of self defense. If takes away a motive for someone to kill us. That is very personal, and very convincing. The Slayer’s Rule isn’t technical. It is emotional as well as logical. There are technical issues at the periphery of the Slayer’s Rule, but the core issue is the simple emotional idea that “I don’t want someone to have a financial motive to kill me.”

These concepts apply to intentional killings. If our spouse or child accidentally causes our death, so be it. If it is an accident, it isn’t intentional so a financial motive to kill us is not involved. While we don’t want our relative to kill us, we accept the risk of an accident and do not begrudge the relative who accidentally kills use their expectancy that comes when we die.

It is not remarkable if the Slayer’s Rule prevents a reward for intentional killing, but does not prevent a benefit from an accidental killing. What would be remarkable would be if it did not do so.

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The Scope of This Course

The Texas Slayer’s Rule has existed in the shadows of Texas law. This course examines the Texas Slayer’s Rule as it applies to insurance death benefits. A separate course covers the Texas Slayer’s Rule as it applies to probate assets and other assets. This course, and the teachers conclusions, are a mosaic stitched together from isolated pieces. Primarily, it is the compilation of Texas cases, viewed through the prism of traditional American Slayer’s Rule concepts. Most Texas cases limited their scope and discussion to the matter at hand without an exhaustive view of the Slayer’s Rule. Most courts seem to have limited knowledge and write within their base of knowledge. Since a statute was enacted early in 1919, Texas courts have focused on the particular words of the statute.

This course text is long. You may study it all if you wish. If you wish to limit the time you spend, some portions are suitable for skimming or skipping. They are identified by this phrase: {May be skimmed or skipped.} It appears with certain historical cases, Deveroex and Crawford, interpleader and venue, and insurance company liability and entitlement for fees. Those topics will be of interest to some, but do not generally reflect the current Slayer’s Rule so skimming or skipping is appropriate.

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Case Study Method

This course uses the case study method. You learn from the actual words of the court. The author provides commentary, editing, and case selection. Since each case is presented in one piece, you can gain a sense of the entire case. However, cases often involve more than one issue. The cases are grouped by one issue in the case, but there are often multiple issues. As a result, issues are sometimes covered by cases which are not grouped under that issue. A symbol (* * * * *) separates cases and topics so that more easily move to the next one, by scrolling or searching for the symbol * * * * *.

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Issues Explored in This Course

In order to provide the full texture of the Texas Insurance “Slayer’s Rule,” this course examines:

1. historical cases going back to 1900;

2. cases exploring the liability of the insurance company for fees and penalties for nonpayment of the benefits and entitlement of the insurance company for legal fees;

3. legal fees for Slayer’s Rule litigation on behalf of a minor ward and the implications for a guardian, prospective guardian and lawyer;

4. multistate choice of law and traditional intrastate venue issues;

5. a criminal conviction as collateral estoppel or evidence of a slaying that causes Slayer’s Rule forfeiture;

6. whether Slayer’s Rule litigation must wait for resolution of criminal litigation

7. the distinction between insurance or an employee benefit;

8. who receives the death benefit instead of the disqualified slayer;

9. sanctions in insurance Slayer’s Rule litigation; and

10. the core Slayer’s Rule issues of whether the death was accidental or intentional, illegality; wrongfulness, willfulness, insanity; and proof that the slayer slayed and that the deceased was slayed.

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Texas Courts and the Slayer’s Rule

Texas cases do not call the Slayer’s Rule the “Slayer’s Rule.” Slayer’s Rule is the accepted term in American law. We use the term because it is both correct and convenient.

Texas courts don’t necessarily apply the Slayer’s Rule statutes as written. When they choose, the courts misconstrue the words of the statute to fit their sense of right and wrong. In effect, they revise the statute to fit their idea of the “common law” which, in Slayer’s Rule cases, is their concept of what the law should be. In two respects, the Texas Supreme Court has altered the statute by “construing” it.

1. The Texas Supreme Court, over a dissent, construed the statutory mandate that the insurance benefits which do not pass to the the slayer pass to the “nearest relatives” of the victim as meaning that the benefits pass to the “contingent beneficiary named in the policy.” Why? It seems that the court preferred that result. After about a decade, the court, confessed error and admitted that it has no idea why it came to such a conclusion. Why did it change its mind? Apparently in the later case it preferred the statutory result to the one it had invented. In 1987, the year the the Texas Supreme Court decided to follow the statutory language and award the death benefit to the nearest relative rather than the contingent beneficiary, the Texas legislature changed the statute to award the death benefit to the contingent beneficiaries after all.

2. The Texas Supreme Court, in Greer, construed a “willful” slaying as applying to an “illegal” slaying but not to a legal slaying. Are these concepts the same? I think not. For example, a killing in self defense can be willful without being illegal, as I view those terms. It can be intentional, knowing, rational, and legal. The Supreme Court “construed” “willful” as meaning both intentional and illegal. Perhaps the Slayer’s Rule should be limited to illegal slayings. The Supreme Court clearly believed that. There also is an argument against having an illegality requirement. The court does not explore it. The argument is that a person who intentionally kills should not receive a financial reward for the killing, regardless of the motive or circumstances. If that was the law, a person who intentionally and legally kills would neither gain nor lose property as a result of the killing. That might be a good rule. That might be what the legislature intended. Regardless of the merits, the illegality requirement was created by the Supreme Court which says it sees the requirement in the statute. In Bounds, the Texas Supreme Court uses the word wrongfully instead if the word illegally. It doesn’t explain its thinking. It may not have been thinking. The words are not the same. Can a killing be illegal without being wrongful, or wrongful without being illegal? The statute does not contain the words “wrongful” or “illegal” The statutory word is “willful.” The words are different. The meanings are different. The court seems to use whichever word it feels like using at the moment.

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The Insurance Company as a Victim

Mellott is an historic look at a case in which the Slayer’s Rule as we know it was not considered. Instead, the insurance company sought to void the death benefit on the grounds that the beneficiary slayed the insured. In a contest between a murderer who murdered for the purpose of collecting the insurance and an insurance company which accepted the premiums but would like to keep the death benefit for itself, a jury may not be able to find a pleasing result. Where there is doubt about the cause of death, but no doubt that the insurance company is. . . an insurance company that wants to keep the money . . . the insurance company loses and the widow, whether slayer or not, takes the money. If the contest had been between the possibly guilty widow and clearly innocent relatives, the evidence of a slaying might have been perceived as more compelling.

The Slayer’s Rule may be more appealing than a rule providing that the insurance company keeps the money, but perhaps the insurance company should not be required to suffer the loss in a case like Mellott if there really was a murder - especially if the insurance is purchased just before the slaying as part of a scheme to convert premiums into a death benefit through purchase of a policy and murder. If there is a slaying, the insurance company is a victim too.

With the Slayer’s Rule that exists today, the insurance company is victimized by each slaying, but no one seems concerned. The analysis is simple. The death benefit is “accelerated” by the murder. The insurance company pays now instead of later. It also loses the future premiums that go unpaid but would have been paid until the death would otherwise have occured. Clearly the insurance company loses, even though it is not at fault.

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A Windfall

Under the Slayer’s Rule of today, “contingent beneficiaries” of the deceased receive a windfall. It is a windfall in two respects. If there had been no slaying, but the death had occured from another cause, the contingent beneficiaries would have received nothing. The regular beneficiary, who in that case would not be a slayer, would receive the benefit. Secondly, if there was no slaying, the deceased would be alive and no one would get any death benefit. The slaying creates a windfall for the contingent beneficiaries who benefit from the Slayer’s Rule. The contingent beneficiaries might regret the death of the decedent, but then again, they might applaud it. The contingent beneficiaries laugh or cry all the way to the bank.

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A Radical Idea

Since a slaying that triggers the Slayer’s Rule creates a cash windfall for the contingent beneficiaries, and a cash detriment to the innocent insurance company, should there be an equitable adjustment to make the insurance company whole by reducing the windfall to the contingent beneficiaries? That could be done by deducting the present value of the future premiums which would have been paid if the deceased had lived to the actuarially average date of death, and reducing the death benefit to its present value, calculated as if the deceased had not been slayed. I have never seen any such suggestion. It deserves consideration. As the Slayer’s Rule now functions, the detriment to the insurance company is ignored and the fact that the contingent beneficiaries receive a windfall is ignored. The focus is strictly on the slayer and the desire to prevent the slayer from benefiting. That is an incomplete analysis because it ignores the insurance company loss and the contingent beneficiary windfall.

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Texas Constitution

“No conviction shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture of estate, and the estates of those who destroy their own lives shall descend or vest as in case of natural death.”[2]

Texas Code of Criminal Procedure

“No conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate.[3]

Texas Probate Code

“Convicted Persons and Suicides. No conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate, except in the case of a beneficiary in a life insurance policy or contract who is convicted and sentenced as a principal or accomplice in wilfully bringing about the death of the insured, in which case the proceeds of such insurance policy or contract shall be paid as provided in the Insurance Code of this State, as same now exists or is hereafter amended; nor shall there be any forfeiture by reason of death by casualty; and the estates of those who destroy their own lives shall descend or vest as in the case of natural death.”[4]

Texas Insurance Code

‘Whenever any person shall procure the issuance of a policy of insurance on his or her life in any legal reserve life insurance company, and designate in writing filed with the company the beneficiary to receive the proceeds thereof, the company issuing such policy shall, in the absence of the receipt by it of notice of an adverse claim to the proceeds of the policy from one having a bona fide legal claim to such proceeds or a part thereof, pay such proceeds becoming due on the death of the insured to the person so designated as beneficiary, and such payment so made, in the absence of such notice received by the insurance company prior to the date of the payment of the proceeds, shall discharge the company from all liability under the policy.[5]

Article 21.23 effective August 31, 1987.

“The interest of a beneficiary in a life insurance policy or contract heretofore or hereafter issued shall be forfeited when the beneficiary is the principal or an accomplice in willfully bringing about the death of the insured. When such is the case, a contingent beneficiary named by the insured in the policy shall receive the insurance unless that contingent beneficiary was also a principal or an accomplice in willfully bringing about the death of the insured. If no contingent beneficiary is named by the insured in the policy or if all contingent beneficiaries named by the insured in the policy were principals or accomplices in willfully bringing about the death of the insured, the nearest relative of the insured shall receive said insurance.”[6]

Article 21.23 until August 31, 1987

Historic Cases

Mutual Life v. Mellott 57 S.W. 887 (Tex.Civ.App. 1900)

{May be skimmed or skipped, but Mellott is interesting}

“This suit was brought by appellee to recover of appellant upon a policy of insurance issued by said company upon the life of William Mellott, deceased, and payable to appellee. The appellant, by its amended answer, upon which the cause was tried, admitted the execution of the policy, the payment of the premium, the death of the deceased, and proof of loss, but alleged, in substance, that plaintiff ought not to recover upon the policy sued on, for the reason that she had willfully and maliciously caused and produced the death of the said William Mellott by administering to him strychnine poison for the purpose of causing his death, and thereby receiving and enjoying the benefits of said policy. The cause was tried upon this issue alone, the appellant assuming the burden of proof, and being accorded the right to open and close the evidence and argument in the case, and resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of appellee for the sum of $5,362.50, the amount found due upon said policy.

“Briefly stated, the facts proven on the trial are as follows: The policy on the life of William Mellott was issued on the 15th day of March, 1898, and said Mellott died on June 13, 1898. The evidence is conflicting as to whether Mr. or Mrs. Mellott procured the issuance of the policy, but the premium on the policy was paid by the appellee. About the same time this policy was issued appellee procured the issuance of a policy for $10,000 by the same company on the life of Lucinda Jeffers, and had said policy assigned to her by Mrs. Jeffers. The evidence is conflicting as to whether or not Mrs. Jeffers knew that a policy had been issued on her life, and that she had transferred same to appellee; she testifying that appellee told her shortly after she had signed the paper, which she understood only gave appellee the right to use the policy, that she failed to pass a satisfactory examination, and that the policy had not been issued, in which statement she was corroborated by the testimony of two other witnesses. Mrs. Jeffers about this time made a will bequeathing all of her property, including the policy in question, to appellee. The deceased, William Mellott, for more than a year previous to his death, had been in bad health, suffering from trouble with his stomach and bowels, which trouble had at times caused him to have convulsions. About a month before his death he was seriously ill with entero coletis, the same character of disease which his attending physician testified was the cause of his death. On the 6th day of June, 1898, he was taken suddenly ill, and Dr. McKay was sent for; he being the nearest physician, and the emergency not allowing his regular physician to be sent for. He was first attacked with spasms or convulsions. Dr. McKay attended him regularly from the 6th to the 13th of June, making several visits each day. This physician testified that the deceased had convulsions from the first day that he was called to see him, and that such convulsions were among the usual symptoms, or rather results, of the disease from which the patient was suffering. His last visit to deceased before his death was about 8 o'clock on the evening before his death. At this time he thought the deceased was better, and did not anticipate a fatal termination of the disease. The deceased began to grow worse shortly after Dr. McKay left, on the evening of the 12th, and died about 4 or 5 o'clock the next morning. The doctor was sent for about 11 o'clock that night, but was not at home, and was again sent for about 3 o'clock. In answer to this last call he went to Mellott’s house, but arrived there just after his death. The preponderance of the evidence is to the effect that the convulsions from which deceased began to suffer shortly after Dr. McKay left him, on the evening of the 12th, were of the same general character as those which deceased had previously had, but were more severe, and continued to increase in frequency and severity until they produced death. One witness, however, a Mr. Sonnen, testified that he was with the deceased from about 8 until about 12 o'clock that night, and that the convulsions were of a different character from those which deceased had previously had. He described the kind of convulsions, and the position which the body of the deceased assumed during the convulsions, and Drs. Red and Knox testified as medical experts that convulsions of the character described by this witness were, in their opinion, produced by strychnine poison. The body of the deceased was exhumed about six months after his death, and a chemical analysis of the stomach failed to show any trace of strychnine.

“The preponderance of the evidence is to the effect that Mrs. Mellott and her husband lived together amicably, though two witnesses testified to the contrary. Two witnesses, a Mrs. Kuhns and a child named Lena Stensil, testified that Mrs. Mellott came to Mrs. Kuhns' home about a week before Mr. Mellott’s death, and sent the child to a drug store some five or six blocks from Mellott’s residence for 25 cents worth of strychnine, which the child purchased, and gave to Mrs. Mellott, who said she wanted it to kill cats with. Mrs. Mellott denied all of this, and denied that she had ever seen the child, Lena Stensil, before the former trial of this case, and the druggist from whom the child claimed to have bought the strychnine testified that he had no recollection of the matter. Shortly after the policy was taken out on the life of Mrs. Jeffers, and while she was living at Mrs. Mellott’s, she had a violent attack of vomiting, which came on just after she had drunk a toddy given her by Mrs. Mellott. Dr. Brumby, who attended Mrs. Jeffers during this attack, testified that she was suffering from an attack of cholera morbus. Drs. Red and Knox did not see the deceased during his last sickness, and their opinion as to the cause of his death is based entirely upon the character of the convulsions as described by the witness Sonnen, who had no technical knowledge nor experience of any kind with sickness of the character of which Mellott died, and who, as before stated, is contradicted by the statements of all the other witnesses who were with Mellott during the night of his death. Dr. McKay diagnosed Mellott’s disease as interitis, or Jacksonian epilepsy, due to the absorption of ptomaine or toxic materials from decomposition of the product of inflammation of the bowels, which produced the convulsions with which Mellott died. Dr. Knox testified that he did not think interitis ever produced Jacksonian epilepsy, and that he knew of no connection between the two diseases. Dr. Red further testified that convulsions could be produced by ptomaine poison caused by bowel trouble; that the physician in attendance on the deceased during his last sickness would be more apt to form a correct conclusion, all of these things coming under his own vision, than any doctor in the world could from a description of the man’s case; and that if this man was first attacked with convulsions on the 6th day of June, and the convulsions continued at various intervals to the 12th, and on the night of the 12th became more violent, and continued at more frequent intervals, until about 5 o'clock on the morning of the 13th, when the patient died in a convulsion, the character of the convulsions not having changed, he would not be so ready to come to the conclusion that the patient died from strychnine poison. He further testified that a man of ordinary constitution would not ordinarily live more than one or two hours after he began to have violent convulsions from strychnine. It was not shown that the deceased had any property or any income out of which he could pay the premiums on his policy, but at the time this policy was issued he gave up $4,000 insurance, which he had previously obtained. Several persons were with the deceased during the entire night on which he died, and there is no evidence that appellee gave him any medicine or anything at all at any time during the entire night, nor that anything was given him by any one, except the chloroform which was administered through the nostrils whenever a convulsion occurred.

“We conclude that the evidence in this case amply sustains the verdict. . . . While there are facts in evidence which tend to cast suspicion upon appellee, they are not of such force and conclusiveness as would, in our opinion, have authorized the jury to have found that appellee administered poison to her husband, and the great preponderance of the evidence is against such contention.

“We find no reversible error in the judgment of the court below, and it is affirmed.”

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Murchison is said case in which it is said, and said again. It is also said that Murchison was the catalyst for the statutory Slayer’s Rule. Murchison is an example of the legal and judicial thinking before the Roosevelt era in which it was thought that the law was the law and must be followed. Later in the century, the Texas Supreme Court was much more flexible, creative, and inventive in finding that what the court wanted the law to be was the law and must be followed. Murchison cites federal Slayer’s Rule common law which has since been ignored by the Texas Courts. That body of law may be applicable today, and should not be ignored. After a statute was passed, in Greer, the Texas Supreme Court mentions that Texas had such a common law. Murchison is a good place to start a search for a Texas common law Slayer’s Rule.

We can’t help but be amused by some of the phrasing in Murchison, so let’s see what said court said in said case.

Murchison v. Murchison 203 S.W. 423 (Tex.Civ.App. - Beaumont 1918)

{May be skimmed or skipped, but this is the case that caused the legislature to enact the Slayer’s Rule statute.}

“This suit was filed in the district court of Angelina county by G. R. Murchison, Dailey Murchison, Ross Murchison, Jr., and Dora Faris, the latter being joined pro forma by her husband, W. B. Faris, as plaintiffs, against Margurite Murchison and Royal Indemnity Company as defendants; the purpose of the suit being to recover a judgment against the Royal Indemnity Company on a policy of accident insurance issued by said company upon the life of one R. H. Murchison.

“It was alleged in the petition that G. R. Murchison was the father, and Dailey Murchison and Ross Murchison, Jr., were the brothers, and said Dora Faris the sister, of the said R. H. Murchison, who, it was alleged, died on the 14th of April, 1915; and it was further alleged that the said Margurite Murchison was the wife of said R. H. Murchison at the time of his death. It was further alleged that the said R. H. Murchison left no outstanding debts at the time of his death, and that there was never any administration upon his estate, nor any necessity for any. It was further alleged that the said R. H. Murchison left no child or children surviving him. It was further alleged that the policy of insurance made the basis of the suit was issued by the Royal Indemnity Company on the 4th day of December, 1914, and was in full force and effect at the time of the death of said R. H. Murchison. It was further shown by the petition of plaintiffs that said policy provided that upon the death of said R. H. Murchison, the proceeds thereof should be paid to the said Margurite Murchison as sole beneficiary. It was further alleged in the petition that the said R. H. Murchison met his death at the hands of his said wife, Margurite Murchison, who feloniously killed and murdered him with the intention and for the purpose of securing and obtaining the money which it was provided by the terms of said policy should be paid to her upon the death of said R. H. Murchison.

“It was then alleged, substantially, that because of the fact that the said Margurite Murchison did feloniously kill and murder the said R. H. Murchison, she forfeited all right and interest that she otherwise might have had in and to the proceeds of said policy of insurance as the beneficiary named therein; and, further, it was substantially alleged that because of the fact that the said Margurite Murchison feloniously killed and murdered said R. H. Murchison, she was not only prevented from claiming and recovering from the Royal Indemnity Company the amount of money stipulated to be paid her as beneficiary in said policy, but also that she thereby forfeited any and all right and interest in and to the proceeds of said policy in the hands of said Royal Indemnity Company, and was not, in law, entitled to have said proceeds or any part thereof under the law of descent and distribution of this state, but that plaintiffs, as the father, brothers, and sister of said R. H. Murchison, by reason of such relationship to him, immediately upon the death of said R. H. Murchison became and were entitled to recover of said Royal Indemnity Company the proceeds of said policy still in its hands, as the heirs and next of kin of the said R. H. Murchison. . . .

“The trial court sustained the general demurrer interposed by each of the defendants, and some of the special exceptions, and the plaintiffs having declined to amend, their petition was ordered dismissed, and from that order and judgment of the trial court this appeal has been prosecuted.

“The action of the trial court in sustaining the general demurrers of defendants has been duly assigned as error in this court, and such assignments and propositions thereunder raise two questions only for the consideration of this court. in so far as we have been able to ascertain, but we are not left in the dark in the matter, because we find that no less eminent authority than the Supreme Court of the United States long ago decided this very question, and the opinion of that great court will be found in the case of New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong.[7] In that case we find this expression in the opinion of the court:

“ ‘It would be a reproach to the jurisprudence of the country, if one could recover insurance money payable on the death of a party whose life he had feloniously taken. As well might he recover insurance money upon a building that he had willfully fired.’

“It has been a long time, it is true, since the Supreme Court of the United States used the language just quoted, but in all the years since then that court seems never to have changed its views on the question. Innumerable cases from that court might be cited, more or less relevant on the point, but it would serve no useful purpose to here mention them, because a decision of the question could not be more squarely made by any court, nor could stronger or sounder reason than is there announced be found.[8] These are but a few of the authorities which announce the rule that it would be against sound public policy to permit any beneficiary in a life insurance policy, who should feloniously take the life of the insured, to recover money due under the terms of the policy; and without discussing the question further, this court is perfectly satisfied with the rule as announced in those cases, and in so far as this court is concerned, nothing short of an express and unmistakable declaration in the Constitution or statutory law of this state, or a decision necessary upon the very point by the Supreme Court of this state, would cause us to subscribe to the doctrine that to permit a beneficiary in any character of insurance policy to recover life insurance money upon the contract itself, after having feloniously killed the insured with the intention and for the purpose of accelerating the due date of such policy and obtaining possession of such money, would not be against the public policy of this state, regardless of what the public policy of some other states may be, as declared by their courts.

“It is the contention of appellees in this case that because article 1, section 21, of the Constitution of this state provides that ‘no conviction shall work forfeiture of estate,’ and because article 2465 of the Revised Statutes of this state provides, substantially, the same, it should be held by this court that the people of this state, both by their representatives in the constitutional convention and in the legislative halls, have declared the public policy of this state to be in favor of permitting such a beneficiary to recover upon the terms of the contract of insurance. We cannot accept the correctness of this contention by counsel. We therefore hold that if the right of Margurite Murchison to the proceeds of the policy in question depended upon the provisions of the policy itself, as a contract, then we would be compelled to hold, and without any reluctance whatever, that the trial court was in error in sustaining the general demurrer of either of the appellees.

“The second question, however, for determination, in legal contemplation is this: Assuming the truth of the allegation in plaintiffs’ petition, to the effect that Margurite Murchison feloniously killed and murdered R. H. Murchison for the purpose of sooner obtaining the insurance money on his life, did that fact deprive her of the right as a surviving wife to take the proceeds of the policy after his death, as against the father, brothers, and sister of R. H. Murchison, the latter having left no child or children? This question necessitates a consideration of several articles of our statutes on the subject of descent and distribution:

Article 2465 provides:

‘No conviction shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture of estate, nor shall there be any forfeiture by reason of death by casualty. * * *’

Article 2469 provides:

‘Upon the dissolution of the marriage relation by death, all property belonging to the community estate of the husband and wife shall go to the survivor, if there be no child or children of the deceased or their descendants; but if there be a child or children of the deceased, or descendants of such child or children, then the survivor shall be entitled to one-half of said property, and the other half shall pass to such child or children, or their descendants. * * *