Texas
Trial Court Jurisdiction
YouKnowItAll.com
©
A. Hawkins 2002
A Note on Texas Probate
and Guardianship Jurisdiction
Texas, trial court
probate and guardianship[1] jurisdiction is not
a subject for the timid. There are hundreds of published appellate opinions on
Texas trial court probate jurisdiction issues since probate jurisdiction was
revised in 1973. It is not an easy
subject. A surprisingly large portion of Texas probate litigation is void
because the trial occurs in a court which lacks jurisdiction. Other litigation
is erroneously dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by courts that do have
jurisdiction. Court proceedings without jurisdiction are void. Many lawyers
think estate and trust litigation is easy. It isn't. Many lawyers and judges don't even know the issues, much less the
law. Many clueless lawyers become trial
and appellate judges. Probate trial
court jurisdiction law is complicated. Some law is unwritten. Some remains
undecided. Sometimes the judges on an
appellate court disagree among themselves.
Texas estate jurisdiction has been described as a nightmare[2] but it isn’t literally a nightmare. It is more like a
horror story that causes nightmares for those who are exposed to it. Do you dare read on?
Texas probate
jurisdiction is not simple or rational.
Much is unclear and unsettled. It is a mess.[3] If anyone thinks
they know it all, this course may change your opinion. When it comes to Texas probate jurisdiction,
no one knows it all. No one can know it all. For those who enjoy complexity,
this course is a delight. Those who seek rational patterns will be
frustrated. These cases may give you a
headache. Aspirin may help.
Keeping Score
Some might want to note
the number of cases in which:
1. The trial court had jurisdiction to hear what
it heard.
2. The trial court did not have jurisdiction to
hear what it heard.
3. The court of appeals claims that judicial
efficiency is the goal, thus demonstrating a sly sense of humor.
The
Process
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and dates. After you complete your
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4. YouKnowItAll.com provides a
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credit hours you earned. If you are in the Texas bar, we report your credit to
the State Bar of Texas. If you are in
another bar and need something else, let us know.
* * * * *
This course is primarily
a case study which relies on the words of the courts which are quoted so that
you may read them yourself. The teacher
has selected quotations; deleted
original emphasis, added the authors emphasis; and moved citations to
footnotes. Commentary by the teacher is included in the text and in
footnotes. Five asterisks ( * * * * * )
identify each new case, If a case doesn’t interest you, just search for * * * *
* to find the next one. This also helps if you wish to go back to reread a
case.
There are three kinds of
footnotes.
1. Footnotes
by the court retain the court’s original number. Our footnote is a footnote to
that number.
2.
Footnotes that move citations to the footnotes are intended to make the
material more readable. The footnote will have the court’s citations.
3.
Footnotes by the author contain commentary.
If you read this course
online, your browser will probably let you click on a footnote number to go to
the footnote and click on the number in the footnote to return to the
text. Some browsers will show the
footnote if you hold your curser over the footnote number without clicking If you print the text, you may wish to
staple the footnotes separately so you may easily refer to them. They are at
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Table of Contents
Case #1 Columbia
Rio Grande Regional Hospital v. Stover
April
28, 2000 17 S.W.3d 387 (TexApp -Corpus Christi 2000)
Case #2 Garza
v. Rodriguez
January
26, 2000 18 S.W.3d 694 (TexApp - San Antonio 2000)
Case #3 Enax
v. Noack
January
31, 2000 12 S.W.3d 609 (TexApp Houston[first dist.] 2000)
Case #4 Schuld v Dembrinski
March
17, 2000, 12 S.W.3d 485 (TexApp - Dallas 2000)
Case #5 Jansen
v. Fitzpatrick
March
2, 2000 14 S.W.3d 426 (TexApp Houston [14th district] 2000)
Case #6A Phifer,
administrator of the Estate of Bailey v. Nacogdoches County Central Appraisal
District
April
25, 2000 (TexApp Tyler 2000) (Opinion later withdrawn... see 6B)
Majority
Opinion by Justice Worthen, joined by Justice Hadden Dissenting Opinion by
Chief Justice Murphy
Case #6B Phifer,
administrator of the Estate of Bailey v. Nacogdoches County Central Appraisal
District
October
31, 2000 45 S.W.3d 159 (TexApp - Tyler 2000) (Replaces 6A)
Opinion by
Justice Worthen,
Case #7 Sabine
Gas Transmission Company, et al. v. Winnie Pipeline Transmission Company and
Southeastern Marketing Company, et al
March
2, 2000 15 S.W.3d 199 (TexApp Houston [14th dist.] 2000)
Case #8 Herring
v. Welborn July 12, 2000 27
S.W.3d 132 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2000)
Majority Opinion by Chief Justice Hardberger,
joined by Justice López, and joined in part by Justice Green who also dissented
in part.
Concurring
and dissenting opinion by: Paul W. Green, Justice
The Course Text
*
* * * *
Case #1 Columbia Rio Grande Regional Hospital v. Stover
April
28, 2000 17 S.W.3d 387 (TexApp -Corpus Christi 2000)
Columbia[4] shows how a creditor may turn a claim against an estate
into a liability to the estate, a remarkable feat in most places, but an easy
one in Texas. The path through the
courts is an interesting one that is all too representative of the tangled processing
of probate cases and issues in Texas.
In Texas, the first test in probate
litigation is determining which court has jurisdiction. Many fail that test. The rules governing
creditors claims are difficult and treacherous. The rules governing the
interplay of jurisdiction, creditors claims, and independent administrations
are almost impossible to follow. The best guidebook may be the classic tale of
Alice in Wonderland. Clearly the spirit
of Lewis Carroll is alive. As you read
Columbia, ask yourself what the difference is between a dependent and
independent administration of an estate.
Feel free to be skeptical of the court's analysis of the concept of
county court at law jurisdiction over independent executors.
“Appellant Columbia Rio Grande Regional Hospital, a medical
provider, filed a declaratory action against Stover, independent executrix of
the estate of Reed, deceased. Stover filed a motion for summary judgment
asserting, inter alia, the action was barred by res judicata and collateral
estoppel. . . . We affirm.
“Columbia provided medical services to Reed for an
on-the-job injury. Columbia charged Reed for services provided in the amount of
$15,395.85, and later filed a hospital lien for that amount in Hidalgo County.
1[5] Subsequently, Reed filed suit against his
employer in the 206th District Court in Hidalgo County (Reed Lawsuit). Columbia
filed notice of its hospital lien in the Reed Lawsuit. 2[6] During the course of the lawsuit Reed died,
and Stover filed an application to probate Reed's will. The probate court,
County Court at Law No. 4, Hidalgo County, in Cause No. 25,040-D, appointed
Stover independent executrix of Reed's estate. Stover stepped in as plaintiff
in the Reed Lawsuit. When the lawsuit settled, the 206th District Court entered
judgment whereby the defendant's insurer, Motors Insurance Corporation
(Motors), agreed to tender to Stover the settlement amount of $135,000.00, out
of which Columbia's hospital lien was to be satisfied, depending on the outcome
of litigation between the estate and Columbia. Motors issued a $15,395.85 check
payable to Stover's trustee and Columbia. Stover refused to sign the check over
to Columbia and the district court placed the funds in its registry.
“At Stover's request, the district court ordered Motors'
check transferred to the registry of the county court where the estate was
being probated. Columbia then filed an authenticated claim for Reed's medical
expenses in the probate proceeding. In response, Stover filed a motion to bar
Columbia's claim asserting the claim did not attach to the estate or,
alternately, the claim was untimely filed. The probate court granted Stover's
motion.
“Contemporaneously with these proceedings, Columbia filed an
original declaratory judgment action against Stover urging its rights pursuant
to the hospital lien. Columbia's action was assigned the same cause number as
the probate proceeding in County Court at Law No. 4. Stover answered,
counterclaimed, and filed a motion for summary judgment based on the
affirmative defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel. In her motion,
Stover asserted Columbia's causes of action were barred because Columbia's
claims had been adjudicated by either: (1) the judgment of the 206th District
Court regarding Reed's personal injury cause of action; or (2) the order of the
probate court barring Columbia's claim. Columbia responded and objected to
Stover's summary judgment evidence. Columbia also filed a cross motion for
summary judgment and amended its petition. Stover did not amend her motion.
“On January 26, 1998, by agreement of the parties, the
probate court severed Columbia's action against Stover from the probate
proceeding and assigned the severed action cause number 25,040-D-1. On February
3, 1998, the probate court granted Stover's summary judgment motion. The probate
court did not rule on Columbia's cross motion for summary judgment. On February
10, 1998, Stover non-suited her counterclaim against Columbia.
“In addition to the foregoing litigation, Columbia filed
suit against Motors in County Court at Law No. 3, asserting liability for
paying over the hospital lien and for not paying the proceeds directly to
Columbia. Motors filed an unopposed motion to consolidate Columbia's suit
against Motors with cause number 25,040-D. The motion was granted on February
4, 1998.
“By points of error one and three Columbia complains that
the summary judgment is not final because it does not dispose of all claims and
parties. Columbia first asserts this appeal is taken from cause number
25,040-D, the cause into which its claims against Motors were consolidated.
Columbia argues that because the summary judgment does not address its claims
against Motors, it is interlocutory. In response, Stover asserts this appeal is
from cause number 25,040-D-1, a cause severed out of 25,040-D. Stover contends
because Columbia's claims against Motors were never before the trial court in
the severed cause, she did not need to address them.
“We agree with Stover that the appeal is from case number
25,040-D-1. On January 26, 1998, the
trial court signed an agreed order severing Columbia's cause of action against
Stover from the probate proceeding, cause number 25,040-D, and assigning that
action a new cause number, 25,040-D-1.[7] The court granted Stover's summary judgment
in the severed action on February 3, 1998. The following day, February 4, 1998,
Columbia's lawsuit against Motors was consolidated with the probate proceeding,
cause number 25,040-D, not the severed cause. Columbia's claims against Motors
were never before the trial court in cause number 25,040-D-1. As Motors was
never a party to the severed lawsuit, it was not necessary for the summary
judgment to address Columbia's claims against Motors.
“. . . Finally,
Stover concedes that the order was interlocutory because the summary judgment order
did not address Stover's counterclaims. The probate court, however, non-suited
Stover's counterclaim on February 10, 1998, seven days after the entry of the
summary judgment. Where an interlocutory order is entered disposing of the
interests of less than all parties and claims, that order does not become final
until a subsequent order is entered disposing of the remaining parties and
claims.[8] Once an order has been entered disposing of
all remaining parties and issues, all the orders merge, creating a final and
appealable judgment. Id. Therefore, the probate court's summary judgment,
interlocutory in nature when granted, became final on February 10, 1998, when
the trial court disposed of Stover's counterclaim. Because we conclude the
judgment from which Columbia appealed is a final judgment, this Court has
jurisdiction to hear Columbia's appeal. . . .
“Res judicata prevents the relitigation of a claim or cause
of action that has been finally adjudicated, as well as related matters that,
with the use of diligence, should have been litigated in the earlier suit.[9] The claim of res judicata requires proof of
the following: (1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction; (2) identity of parties or those in privity with them; and (3) a
second action based on the same claims as were raised or could have been raised
in the first action.[10]
“We note at the outset that Columbia's brief contains no
assertion that Stover failed to establish the identity of parties, the second
element of res judicata. Further, while Columbia asserts Stover failed to
establish the third element of res judicata, a second action based on the same
claims as were raised or could have been raised in the first action, its brief
contains no argument, supported by citations to authorities and the record, as
to why its declaratory judgment action is not based on claims raised or claims
that could have been raised.[11] Accordingly, Columbia's argument is
restricted to its contention that Stover did not establish the first element of
res judicata, a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
“Columbia first argues that there is no prior order
adjudicating its claims. Columbia contends that the probate court had no
jurisdiction to enter the order; therefore, the prior probate order granting
Stover's motion to barr Columbia's lien in the probate proceeding is void.
Columbia asserts that the probate order constitutes a nullity and cannot be the
basis of a defense of res judicata.
“Columbia contends claim administration by an independent
administrator is to be conducted in accordance with sections 145 and 146 of the
Texas Probate Code without further action by the court. Columbia argues section
145(h) expressly denies the probate court jurisdiction in the administration of
the estate, including claims administration. Stover asserts the probate court
has jurisdiction pursuant to sections 5 and 5A of the code. Stover urges
sections 5 and 5A must be read in conjunction with the last phrase of section
145(h) allowing for intervention where the code specifically provides for
action in the probate court.
Section 145(h) of the probate code provides:
When an independent administration has been created, and the
order appointing an independent executor has been entered by the county court,
and the inventory, appraisement, and list aforesaid has been filed by the
executor and approved by the county court, as long as the estate is represented
by an independent executor, further action of any nature shall not be had in
the county court except where this Code specifically and explicitly provides
for some action in the county court.[12]
“While the general purpose of section 145 is to free the
independent executor from the control of the court, except where the code
specifically and explicitly provides otherwise,[13] it is equally clear
that courts have determined the legislature did not intend for the independent
administrator to be completely free from judicial supervision.[14] Because we conclude that section 145(h) does
not deny a statutory county court jurisdiction over an independent
administration, we look to code provisions that address probate jurisdiction in
statutory county courts.
“The general jurisdiction of a statutory county court
sitting in probate is described in sections 5 and 5A. The applicable provisions
of section 5 include:
(c) In those counties where there is a statutory
probate court, county court at law, or other statutory court exercising the
jurisdiction of a probate court, all applications, petitions and motions
regarding probate and administrations shall be filed and heard in such courts
and the constitutional county court, rather than in the district courts, unless
otherwise provided by the legislature, and the judges of such courts may hear
any of such matters sitting for the judge of any of such courts. In contested
matters, the judge of the constitutional county court may on his own motion,
and shall on the motion of any party to the proceeding, transfer the proceeding
to the statutory probate court, county court at law, or other statutory court
exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court, which may then hear the
proceeding as if originally filed in such court.
. . .
(e) All courts exercising original probate
jurisdiction shall have the power to hear all matters incident to an estate.[15]
“Significantly, probate code section 5(c) states that all
motions regarding probate and administrations shall be filed and heard in
statutory county courts exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court. [16] Section 5(e) further provides those courts
exercising original probate jurisdiction, which include statutory county courts
pursuant to section 5(c), shall have the power to hear all matters incident to
an estate.[17] This is a general grant of authority to
statutory county courts. [18] Additionally, probate code section 5A(a)
plainly states that in proceedings in statutory county courts at law, the
phrase "incident to an estate" includes "all claims by or
against an estate," and "generally all matters relating to the
settlement, partition, and distribution of estates of deceased persons."[19] This statute codifies case law.[20]
“Columbia's reliance on Carter v. Brady[21] for the proposition
that a probate court has no jurisdiction to determine the validity of claims
against an estate being administered by an independent executor, is misplaced.
Carter predates the legislature's 1973 modification of the jurisdictional
framework for probate matters and case law interpreting those changes.[22] In English, the Texas Supreme Court
recognized that the obvious purpose of the 1973 changes was "to increase
the jurisdiction of such courts in 'matters incident to an estate' so that a
decedent's estate could be more efficiently settled in one proceeding." [23] Subsequently, the legislature added section
5A to the code, further expanding statutory county court jurisdiction to
matters including, "but not limited to, all claims by or against an estate
. . , and generally all matters relating to the settlement, partition, and distribution
of estates. . . ."[24] A probate court's jurisdiction has been
greatly expanded since Carter.
“County Court at Law No. 4 in Hidalgo County, a statutory
county court, appointed Stover independent executrix of Reed's estate pursuant
to section 145, and administered the probate proceeding.[25] Columbia filed an authenticated claim in the
probate court. Stover filed a motion in the court to bar Columbia's claim, a
claim Stover believed to be barred because it did not attach to the estate or,
alternately, because it was untimely filed. Columbia's claim was against the
estate. The claim necessarily involved the assets of the estate. The outcome
would have a direct bearing on the settlement, partition, and distribution of
the estate. Accordingly, we conclude Stover's motion involved matters
"incident to the estate," and the probate court had jurisdiction to
hear Stover's motion. The probate court's order of September 24, 1997, granting
Stover's motion to bar Columbia's claim is not void for lack of jurisdiction.
“The final order barring Columbia's claim was appealable to
this Court.[26] [27] Because no direct appeal of the September
24, 1997, probate order was taken by Columbia, it cannot now attack the order
collaterally.[28]
“Accordingly, we hold there was a prior final judgment on
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction. Stover established the first
element of res judicata, the only element about which Columbia complains.
Therefore, the summary judgment is sustainable on that ground.
*
* * * *
Case #2 Garza
v. Rodriguez
January
26, 2000 18 S.W.3d 694 (TexApp - San Antonio 2000)
For those who think that
Texas title passes by a will, and not by an order of a probate court, Garza is
very interesting indeed. Garza addresses a devise of real estate in fee simple
subject to a springing executory interest that didn’t spring because an
unexplained constitutional county court order of final probate settling,
approving, and closing an estate granted fee simple absolute title and did not
account for the springing executory interest expressly provided in the will.
Garza does not discuss whether the issue was plead, litigated, considered by
the county court prior to the probate court order or whether the constitutional
county court had proper jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter. The court does not discuss the possibility
that the order was a superfluous and erroneous attempt to recite the will
provisions by the person who drafted the order who was clueless about a fee simple
subject to a springing executory interest.
It seems that the court had enough on its mind without those
considerations.
“Appellants appeal from a dismissal order from the 229th
District Court of Starr County, dismissing their suit to construe a previously
probated will for want of jurisdiction. Because a court is not permitted to
interfere with the final judgment of another court of equal jurisdiction, we
affirm the trial court's order of dismissal.
“Appellants filed a declaratory action in the 229th District
Court in Starr County to construe the previously probated will of their aunt
Maria Lopez de Pena (hereinafter "Pena"), asserting that they are the
legal owners of certain real property bequeathed in Pena's will. The property
at issue consists of nine tracts of land, which have mineral interests. In
their action, appellants also sought partition of the land to which they claim
entitlement.
“Pena's will, executed on January 22, 1943, provided in
relevant part:
It is my will that all the rest and residue of
my property, both real and personal and of any nature and kind whatsoever, and
wherever situated of which I shall die seized and possessed, shall pass to and
be vested in fee simple title to my nephew, Santiago Rodriguez, Jr., son of my
sister Eusebia Lopez de Rodriguez, to be owned and enjoyed by him with God's
and my blessings forever. . . . But should he die without lawful issue of his
body, then, and in that event, it is my will and wish that all of my aforesaid
property shall pass to and be vested in fee simple in my sister, the said
Eusebia Lopez de Rodriguez, her heirs and their descendants per stirpes.
“By this provision, Pena granted to Santiago a fee simple
interest in her real property subject to a shifting executory interest in favor
of Santiago's mother, Eusebia Lopez de Rodriguez, her heirs and their
descendants per stirpes.
Pena died on June 1, 1956; her will was
presented for probate the following week in the constitutional county court of
Starr County. On July 29, 1957[29] [30] an order of final
probate settling, approving, and closing Pena's estate was entered in the
county court.[31] With respect to Santiago's interest, it
provided that:
[T]he remainder of the lands owned by Maria Lopez de Pena,
including all funds in the bank, as well as all real estate and personal
property were bequeathed and given to Santiago Rodriguez, Jr. . . . .[32]
“The final probate order thus granted fee simple absolute
title to the remainder of Pena's estate to Santiago; the final probate order
did not account for the springing executory interest expressly stated in the
will.[33]
“On October 19, 1984,[34] Santiago died
intestate, survived by his wife, Olivia Olivarez Rodriguez, and one adopted
son, Gabriel Rodriguez. Because Santiago died without lawful issue, appellants,
Eusebia Lopez de Rodriguez's heirs, concluded that they became the legal owners
of the real property Pena conditionally devised to Santiago through the 1943
will.
“On July 8, 1986, appellants filed a declaratory action in
the 229th district court of Starr County, asking the court to construe the will
of Pena to declare them the legal and beneficial owners of Pena's property due
to the springing executory interest, which they claim divested Santiago of his
ownership. Appellants also requested the district court to partition the
subject property among them. At the time of this filing, no probate matter
concerning either Pena's estate or Santiago's estate was pending. On August 4,
1986, appellees filed a declaration of heirship in the county court at law[35] of Starr County. That
same day, appellees also filed in the district court their original answer and
a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which the trial court later
granted. . . .
“Appellants argue that the district court erred in
dismissing their suit to construe Pena's will because the district court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the county court over matters "incident to an
estate" when, as here, a probate matter is not pending in the county
court. Construction of a will and issues of title are matters incident to an
estate; thus, the district court had jurisdiction over the matters because the
county court's probate jurisdiction had not been invoked.[36] Appellants further
assert that the district court had jurisdiction to act because their pleadings
requested the imposition of a constructive trust.[37]
“Appellees counter that the trial court properly dismissed
the underlying action because in counties such as Starr County, where there is
a county court at law exercising the jurisdiction of a probate court, all
probate matters shall be filed and heard in such courts and the constitutional
county court, rather than in the district courts.[38] Appellees note that in
section 5(c) counties, district court jurisdiction may be invoked by a proper
transfer or by pleadings that clearly set out a cause of action and request for
relief which the county court at law exercising the jurisdiction of a probate
court cannot provide.[39] Appellees note that the instant case does
not involve a transfer situation; thus, they contend the district court's jurisdiction
could be invoked only if appellants sought relief which the probate court could
not grant. Appellees further argue that because the county court[40] previously acquired jurisdiction over Pena's
estate, the district court would be without authority to consider an attack on
the county court's probate order.
“County courts have the general jurisdiction of a probate
court.[41] In most counties in Texas, the
constitutional county courts ("county courts") act as the probate
court.[42] As a probate court, county
courts are empowered to: [P]robate wills, grant letters testamentary and of
administration, settle accounts of personal representatives, and transact all
business appertaining to estates subject to administration or guardianship,
including the settlement, partition, and distribution of such estates.[43] Historically, a probate court did not have
the power to construe provisions of a will or decide matters of title because
such matters were considered outside the purview of probate matters; they were
considered matters incident to an estate.[44] The construction of a will or issues of
title were thus general civil matters within the jurisdictional reach of the
district courts.[45] [46]
“In 1973,[47] the county court's
probate jurisdiction was expanded when the Legislature undertook a two-step
reform of probate jurisdiction.[48] First, it proposed an amendment to article
5, section 8 of the constitution authorizing a statutory revision of probate
jurisdiction.[49] [50] Second, to carry out
the proposed constitutional mandate, it amended section 5 of the Probate Code.
As amended, section 5 expanded the jurisdiction of the county court in probate
matters to allow it the power to hear all matters incident to an estate,
including, but not limited to, an action to construe a will.[51] Section 5's clause "matter incident to
an estate," however, will not create jurisdiction for the county court in
the absence of a pending probate matter.[52] Stated differently, before a matter can be
regarded as incident to an estate over which the county court acting as a
probate court would have jurisdiction, a probate proceeding must actually be
pending.[53] As explained by the Supreme Court, a court
empowered with probate jurisdiction may only exercise its probate jurisdiction
over matters incident to an estate when a probate matter proceeding related to
such matter is already pending. Bailey v. Cherokee County Appraisal Dist.[54] [55]
“As noted, at the time appellants filed suit in the district
court, no probate matter concerning either Pena's estate or Santiago's estate
was pending. Appellants thus conclude that because a probate matter was not
pending when appellants filed suit, and because appellants' suit concerns
matters traditionally outside the scope of a probate court's jurisdiction, the
district court had jurisdiction over the suit to construe the provisions of
Pena's will. In support of this argument, appellants rely primarily upon
Crawford v. Williams[56]
“In Crawford, a will was admitted to probate in
constitutional county court in 1968.[57] In 1986, several heirs brought suit in the
district court seeking a declaration that the will was null and void due to
fraud, a partition of certain real property, an accounting of rents, royalties,
and waste on the real property, and a distribution of the real property through
the laws of intestacy.[58] The district court set aside the will,
determined heirship, partitioned the real property, and ordered an accounting.[59] In sustaining a challenge that the district
court lacked jurisdiction over the proceeding, the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals determined that because the county court had already acquired
jurisdiction over the estate, and because the later action sought to set aside
an already probated will, the district court, under the doctrine of
noninterference, was prevented from exercising jurisdiction over the matter.[60] The fact that the
action was a direct attack on the county court's order admitting the will to
probate was compelling to the court.[61] The court also seemed to place much
importance on the fact that under amended section 5 of the Probate Code, the
county court would have the jurisdiction to hear the will contest.[62]
“It is not clear from the facts of Crawford whether a final
order of probate, which would close the estate and end the county court's
jurisdiction over the proceeding, was entered. Appellants assume that the
estate was not closed, and therefore argue that Crawford is consistent with the
general rule that once the probate court has acquired jurisdiction over a
probate matter, the district court lacks the power to act. They argue that
since a probate matter was not pending in the instant case, the district court
had jurisdiction to act.
“At oral argument, appellants argued that Gordy v.
Alexander,[63] a case in which the
Amarillo Court of Appeals determined that section 5 of the Probate Code did not
divest the district court of jurisdiction to act in a suit to impose a
constructive trust on assets of an estate where the will was previously
probated, required reversal in the instant case.[64]
“We disagree with appellants' argument and their reliance
upon Crawford and Gordy in the instant case. In fact, our reading of Crawford
requires a result different from the one sought by appellants. Our disagreement
with appellants’ argument lies not in their general explanation of Texas
probate jurisdiction, which is, ‘to say the least, [a] somewhat complex
[scheme].’ [65] We agree that under the current statutory
scheme of probate jurisdiction, a district court can exercise jurisdiction over
a matter incident to an estate where no probate court has otherwise acquired
jurisdiction over the estate. This is so because section 5 of the Probate Code
does not grant the probate court exclusive jurisdiction over matters incident
to an estate.[66] This jurisdictional scheme, however, would
not allow a court to interfere with the final judgment of another court of
equal jurisdiction. Our disagreement with appellants’ argument concerns this
general principle of non-interference.[67]
“By this lawsuit, appellants seek a declaration that they
are the legal and beneficial owners of Pena's property due to the springing
executory interest contained in Pena's will. As previously noted, however, that
future interest was not accounted for in the 1957 final probate order settling,
approving, and closing Pena's estate.[68] The final order, whether by mistake or
design, unambiguously granted[69] Santiago fee simple absolute title to the
remainder of Pena's estate. That order was not challenged.[70] The current action challenges the 1957 final
probate order to the extent that appellants seek a construction of Pena's will
that is contrary to what was previously determined, correctly or incorrectly,
by the probate court. A court is not permitted to interfere with the final
judgment of another court of equal jurisdiction.[71] An action to undo an incorrect former
judgment must be brought in the court rendering the judgment or in a higher
court.[72] Because the instant action seeks to undo the
prior probate order, the district court properly determined it did not have
jurisdiction.[73]
*
* * * *
Case #3 Enax
v. Noack
January
31, 2000 12 S.W.3d 609 (TexApp Houston[first dist.] 2000)
Is that enough fun with
trial court jurisdiction? No such luck. We turn to Enax, in which the court of appeals finds subject matter
jurisdiction of a county court at law, in a guardianship, to impose a
constructive trust. Transfer from a county court at law to a district court is
upheld. A district court judgment based on a county court at law jury verdict
is upheld. The court of appeals believes that the legislature increased the
jurisdiction of guardianship courts while specifically intending to make no
such change. Probate litigation is full
of surprises.
“The primary issues on appeal are (1) whether the county
court at law may impose a constructive trust in a guardianship proceeding and
(2) whether the county court at law may transfer the case to the district court
for rendition of judgment when the ward dies after the jury reaches its
verdict, but before a final judgment is signed. We reverse in part and affirm
in part.
“Lloyd Enax is Hilda Enax's son. Hilda developed Alzheimer's
disease in the late 1980s, and Lloyd assumed care of Hilda when she became a
widow in 1989. In October 1990, Lloyd sold Hilda's home in Spring and bought a
new home for her in Brenham, near his home. Hilda lived in the Brenham home
until April 1996, when she was moved to a nursing home. Lloyd then sold the
Brenham home. During this time, Lloyd allowed his property to become commingled
with Hilda's property.
“In February 1996, Lloyd applied and was appointed guardian
of Hilda's person and estate. In August 1996, Hilda's granddaughter, Lori
Noack-May, filed an application to revoke Lloyd's guardianship and to be
appointed as the successor guardian. On August 27, 1996, the county court at
law removed Lloyd as guardian, appointed Lori as successor guardian,
temporarily restrained Lloyd from spending any proceeds from the sale of
Hilda's house, and froze Lloyd's bank account. The county court at law later
issued a temporary injunction incorporating the terms of the temporary
restraining order. In September 1996, Lori, as successor guardian, sued Lloyd
to recover Hilda's property under theories of negligence, fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty. Lori also asked the court to
impose a constructive and resulting trust.
“After a question arose concerning a conflict of interest,
the county court at law appointed Hilda's daughter, Sheila Enax, as guardian,
and Sheila became the plaintiff in the suit against Lloyd. Before the case came
to trial, the county court at law ordered Lloyd to turn all of Hilda's property
over to Sheila and to make a final accounting of his administration as
guardian. Lloyd never complied.
“The case was tried to a jury in February 1997. The jury
returned a verdict for Sheila, awarding $191,989.65 in actual damages and
$216,989.65 in exemplary damages and imposing a constructive trust on Lloyd for
$141,989.65. On February 26, 1997, the county court at law rendered judgment on
the verdict. In March 1997, the county court at law dissolved the temporary
injunction.
“Lloyd timely filed a motion for new trial and a motion to
modify the judgment. On May 13, 1997, the county court at law signed an amended
interlocutory judgment, which in part reduced the actual damages by $5,000.00.
The judgment was made interlocutory to allow an appraisal of real estate owned
by Lloyd that would be subject to the constructive trust.
“Hilda died on June 21, 1997, before the county court at law
signed an amended final judgment. In August 1997, Verna Lois Noack was
appointed as the executrix of Hilda's estate, and the county court at law
allowed her to substitute as the plaintiff. On October 9, 1997, the county
court at law transferred the case[74] to the district court with the district
court's permission. On December 30, 1997, the district court signed a final
amended judgment, awarding $186,989.65 in actual damages and $216,989.65 in
exemplary damages and imposing a constructive trust on Lloyd for $141,989.65.
“. . . Lloyd brings an issue of first impression, contending
the county court at law lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to impose a
constructive trust in a guardianship proceeding. 1[75] Relying on cases holding that only statutory
probate courts and district courts may impose constructive trusts in probate
proceedings, Lloyd argues that the county court at law had no authority to
impose a constructive trust in a guardianship proceeding. We disagree.
“Both Lloyd and Verna agree that in probate proceedings the
constitutional county courts and the statutory county courts at law have no
authority to employ the equitable remedy of imposing a constructive trust.[76] The rationale behind these decisions is
based on an interpretation of Probate Code section 5A: